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EASTERN

F.O.

371

1947

PALESTINE

File No. 951

pp. 10410 - 10693

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Reference: **FO** 271 / 61887

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PALESTINE

7 NOV

Registry Number

E10410/751/31

FROM

Blaney

No.

Reinat

Dated

360/27/47

Received in Registry

23 Oct

7 Nov

*Reinat support for Palestine Arabs.
Transmits copy of letter to Secretariat, Jerusalem
no 360/27/47 discussing probable extent of
Arabic support for Palestine Arabs in event
of a decision by U.N. which the Palestine
Arabs might consider that they must oppose
by force of arms.*

Last Paper

10376

(Minutes.)

Copy Co. (Mr. Harrison)

JBRW.7

References

11/11

(Print)

61887

(How disposed of)

*to Harrison Co.
Nov. 12*

(Action completed)

J. C. W. 12/11

(Index)

[Signature]
2/9/48

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British Legation,

Beirut.

360/27/47.

23rd October, 1947.

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7 NOV

With the compliments

of

Chancery.

Eastern Department,
FOREIGN OFFICE.



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56/27/47.

British Legation,
BEIRUT.

3rd October, 1947.

SECRET

Dear Secretariat,

Your letter No. C.O.749 of October 4th regarding the probable extent of Lebanese support for the Palestine Arabs in the event of a decision by the United Nations Organisation which the Palestine Arabs might consider that they must oppose by force of arms.

2. At the recent session of the Arab League Council there appears to have been a general feeling that the time for action by irregulars was passing, and that it was now up to the Arab armies to take a hand in the solution of the Palestine problem. This, coupled with the decision that no action should be taken as long as British forces remain in Palestine, is perhaps the outstanding feature of the recent meetings. Even the ex-Mufti seems to have been more or less in agreement with this general conclusion, though we suspect that the more extremist of his supporters, if not he himself, accepted the result with a good deal of heart-sourching. It thus appears that in the first round the new element represented by the Arab League secured a victory over the old-timers. It would, however, be rash to assume that Nuri Sa'ad and his friends will be able to maintain their advantage in the second round, which may well be fought in and when a decision unfavourable to the Arabs is reached at the United Nations and before the British withdrawal is effected. In this eventuality the ex-Mufti will probably

The Secretariat,
Beirut.

/s/ ...

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be exposed to considerable pressure from his supporters and will himself be tempted to take the plunge and to precipitate action by irregulars in Palestine in the hope of increasing his own prestige. It is also possible that he may be unable to control the extremist elements even if he wished to. According to our information, however, no definite decision on this from our point of view important question has been taken. In all probability the Arab League Council could be reassembled at once to review the situation in the light of the United Nations decision.

3. As regards the Lebanon, it is noteworthy that the Christians from the President downwards, i.e. the pro-régime elements and the reactionaries, have been uneasy since the publication of the Arab League decision to take military measures. While ready to support the Palestine Arabs with resolutions, money, arms and even men, in the guise of irregulars, the Lebanese Christians, including those now in the Government, shrink from the idea of intervention on a regular military basis. It is moreover generally realised that the Lebanese army could fire off all its ammunition in a few hours, and even if carefully husbanded, their supplies would only permit of a campaign limited both in scope and duration. No Lebanese troop movements have been reported since the Arab League decision to send forces to the frontier (though their bellicose Minister of Defence, the Sir Bejjid Arslan, has inspected the frontier areas and some additional equipment has been sent to the front) and this would be justified, if necessary, to the Arab League by the fact that Lebanese troops are permanently stationed in Jerusalem. In the event, therefore, of an Arab attempt at the military occupation of Palestine following the British withdrawal, Lebanese participation will almost certainly be symbolic.

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4. Turning to your specific question regarding Lebanese aid to Palestine in the event of a United Nations Organisation decision unfavourable to the Arabs, we would offer very tentatively the following replies.

(a) Armed men.

The Lebanese Army will certainly make no move until a decision is reached by the Arab League in favour of joint military action and even then, as suggested above, Lebanese participation will only be symbolic. There is no doubt, however, that the Lebanese Government would do nothing to prevent armed bands (e.g. Syrians or Iraqis) transiting the country. Nor are they likely to make any difficulties for Lebanese volunteers. As regards the numbers of these latter, it would depend on whether or not the Government organised and supported a recruiting drive (if they do this, it will probably be a half-hearted effort) but, as you will see from the following appreciation of the situation region by region, we do not think that volunteers would exceed 1,000 or 1,500, and that only if they were offered regular remuneration. In South Lebanon the Shia leader, Ahmad Hassan, has been very active of late in the cause of Palestine and according to his own estimation he could put into the field some 1,000 to 1,500 armed men. If arms were provided by the organising authorities, he maintains that he will be able to call on more. But perhaps 500 men from this area will be a fair estimate. As regards the Bekaa, the Shias of Central though well armed are so divided amongst themselves that the various tribes would not dare demand themselves of any of their armed men. From the Bealbak area it is estimated, however, that Sulhan Hassan, if paid, could call up two or three hundred armed Shias. Among the Druze the Deputy Imam Hassan has been very active of late and has

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been freely cooperating with Izzat al-Musawi but it is not thought that it could produce more than 50 from his district. The Christians of the hills are not expected to do much by way of volunteering. In the hilly districts of Beshaye and Marjayoun perhaps a hundred (Arabi, Izzat) could be forthcoming. Generally speaking, the standard of health in the plain of the Bekaa where malaria is rampant is such that the contribution of the area is unlikely to be impressive. In Mount Lebanon the Christians will almost certainly take no part and, generally speaking, the Druzes, who owing to developments in the Jebel Druze are displeased with the Syrians, and more generally with the Moslems as a whole, are not expected to do very much. It is known that the Jabalite will probably restrain their faction, but the same cannot with any certainty be said of the Arslans (to which family the Minister of Defense belongs). The Amir Hassan el Atrash has informed his Majesty's chargé d'affaires that he had told Azza Fasha on October 20th that the Druzes would remain neutral. Speaking of the Lebanon Druzes the Amir said that all those owing allegiance to the Jabalite and also some of the Arslan clan would adopt a similar attitude. There remains Beirut and Tripoli. In spite of considerable propaganda it is not thought that very many of the Beirut Moslems will actually leave for Palestine - they will probably be counted in scores and not in hundreds. In Tripoli (the home of Izzat al-Musawi) owing to competition in patriotism among the rival factions, the result may be somewhat more impressive, but probably not very much. Of the parties organized on a national basis, the I.P.A. who could put into the field not less than 500 well-armed men, are undoubtedly the most redoubtable but there are indications that the Party are in touch with King Abdullah's supporters and that they will take their cue from him. It is known that the Party leader, Anton Saadi, who after defying the Lebanese authorities for several months has recently succeeded in persuading them to withdraw the warrant for his arrest, has reached some sort of understanding with the Atrashes of Jebel Druze, and

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this may well influence his attitude. The Hist (I Hadah) or Haganah (National Jewish Party) which has of late been active in the cause of Palestine and which has been largely responsible for the setting up of the "Newment Palestine Police" in Tel Aviv (including on its committee a number of well-known Christian and Moslem public figures) is largely composed of educated young men who are expected to devote their energies to organization rather than to actual fighting. The Communists will probably lose a great deal of their enthusiasm for joining in a Palestine campaign once it is realized that they will be fighting the Jews, and not the British. He would emphasize that this estimated total of 1,000 to 1,500 armed volunteers is unlikely to be achieved unless they are offered regular and substantial wages. On the other hand, if arms are provided by those responsible for the organization, it may well be that the total number will be greater. As to what happens there is considerable unemployment in certain parts of the Lebanon and those without work may well be tempted to seek their fortunes in Palestine, if not in a combatant role then in the form of looters who will follow up, in the rear. In any case, the number of these is likely to be fairly considerable.

3. Arms and Ammunition.

The Lebanese will undoubtedly allow arms and equipment to pass freely to Palestine. They will also raise no difficulties about the dispatch to Palestine of arms already in the Lebanon and might even make available unofficially some obsolete equipment as is in the possession of the Lebanese-armed forces. There are considerable quantities of arms in the Lebanon and the country will no doubt be obliged to secure them. The success of this campaign will

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of course depend on the prices offered.

(c) Lebanese food.

In addition to official contributions to the Palestine Fund to be set up in accordance with the recent decision of the Arab League, the Lebanese Government will probably encourage public subscriptions, and funds will be forthcoming much as they were during the 1936-38 troubles. It is almost impossible to offer any estimate of the amount but it should be borne in mind that the sums might be considerable if, as is not improbable, Lebanese emigrants are encouraged to contribute. There is no reason why supplies of food for Arab combatants in Palestine should not be made available from the Lebanon should this be necessary, though the cereals shortage is bound to be a serious limiting factor.

(d) Refugees.

The Lebanese Government and the Lebanese people will certainly offer hospitality to Palestine Arab women and children and old people. They would regard this as in keeping with the traditional role of the Lebanon as a place of refuge in the Middle East.

It would finally suggest that the effect of the cereals shortage during the coming nine months on Lebanese assistance to the Palestine Arabs can hardly be over-emphasised. If the situation deteriorates (and the prospects now are far from rosy) there will inevitably be more volunteers and the train of doctors which will certainly follow the combatants will be greater. On the other hand, the contributions in food and money, and the hospitality offered to refugees will be less.

These indications are necessarily tentative and we realise

/that ...

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that events may well prove them to be inaccurate.
Nevertheless, we hope that they will be of some value
to you and to the military authorities.

7. We are sending a copy of this letter to the
Eastern Department of the Foreign Office and to the
Chancery at Damascus.

Yours ever,

Chancery.

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PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 10412/957/31

FROM

FO Minute.

No.

Dated

Received in Registry 7 Nov

*Possible compromise settlements for Palestine.
transmits copy of minute to the Foreign Secretary who suggested that possible compromise settlements which would 'all presumably be variants of partition' should be marked out.*

Last Paper.

10410

(Minutes.)

References.

*See E 10108
which is the same
JB NOV. 11*

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

*apt, Cropper Smith, CO.
from Mr Burrows
24/10.*

*apt. H. Bealey.
U.K. Post
New York.
from Mr Burrows.
23/10.*

(Action completed.)

J. C. 16/14/11

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[Handwritten signature]
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3148 Wt. 26469/137 50m 9/46 (51) F.&S.

SECRET

Draft Minute to the Secretary of State.

10412 12
7 NOV

Possible compromise settlements for Palestine.

The Secretary of State has suggested that we should begin to work out ourselves "possible compromise settlements which would "all presumably be variants of partition".

There are three main directions in which it is possible to modify the majority UNSCOP report:-

(1) Boundaries.

Mr. McGillivray, of the Palestine Administration, who was attached to the United Nations Committee as liaison officer, has suggested that it would be possible to modify the majority plan boundaries in various ways so as to decrease considerably the number of Arabs in the Jewish State without significantly increasing the number of Jews in the Arab State. The proposed modifications are shown in the attached map and the advantages are described in the annexed paper prepared by Mr. McGillivray for the Colonial Office. The total effect of the modifications proposed by Mr. McGillivray (including the transfer of the Arab parts of Jaffa to the Arab State) would be that some ^{139,000} ~~158,000~~ Arabs would be put inside the Arab State instead of inside the Jewish State, while about 3,000 Jews would be put inside the Arab State instead of the Jewish State. This would reduce the number of Arabs in the Jewish State from 497,000 to about ^{358,000} ~~339,000~~. The number of Jews in the Arab State would be increased from about 10,000 to about 13,000.

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A rather larger proportion of Jewish-owned land would be transferred to the Arab State. The largest single modification would be one designed to make Jaffa part of the Arab State and to connect it with that State by a broad corridor. Jaffa must clearly remain Arab and the proposed corridor is almost totally Arab-inhabited. This modification has, however, the disadvantage of separating the Jewish coastal belt into two parts.

Mr. McGillivray has suggested only one minor modification of the allocation of territory in the south (the Beersheba sub-district and the Negeb). There are, however, strong grounds for suggesting that the whole of this area should become part of the Arab State. It is inhabited by some 90,000 Arab Beduin and has at present only small local Jewish settlements, though the Jews hope to be able to develop it by considerable expenditure of capital. This change, in addition to the modifications described above, would reduce the number of Arabs in the Jewish State to about 168,000. 250,000, while handing only an insignificant number of Jews to the Arab State.

If all the modifications described above were introduced we should have ~~This is~~ a major change in the statistical position, and ~~might be thought to~~ go some way towards meeting Arab objections based on the subjection of so many Arabs to a Jewish Government, though it will clearly not be enough to satisfy the Arabs. Any more extensive modification of the boundaries would result in bringing large numbers of Jews into the Arab State unless there were major exchanges of population.

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On the other hand the Jews have given great priority to their plans for making the southern desert blossom like the rose. I regard it as the main area of expansion for the Jewish population. They have already spent large sums of money there on pipelines etc. It would therefore be a particularly hard change for them to accept.

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The changes suggested by Mr. McGillivray do nothing to alter the fundamental conception of the majority plan of two States, each composed of separate pieces of territory connected with each other only by narrow and artificial corridors. In fact, as mentioned, the Jaffa corridor makes this situation even worse by dividing one of the Jewish units into two. Communications within the Arab areas are, however, greatly improved without damage to Jewish communications, except in the case of the Jaffa corridor. On the other hand, the incorporation of Beersheba and the Negeb in the Arab State would improve the position considerably from this point of view by linking up two of the three separate pieces of Arab territory and reducing the pieces of Jewish Arab territory from four (if the/Jaffa corridor is accepted) to three.

(2) Immigration.

From the Arab point of view, probably the most crucial difference between the majority and minority reports is that the former suggests that 150,000 Jews should be allowed to immigrate into the Jewish State during the two-year transitional period and implies that thereafter the amount of immigration into the Jewish State shall be decided by the Government of that State without any restriction. The minority report suggests that for three years from the beginning of the transitional period Jewish immigration shall take place into the Jewish/

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Jewish area of the Federal State in such numbers as not to exceed the absorptive capacity of that area, having due regard to the rights of the population in the area and their anticipated natural rate of increase. (There is no ^{specific} provision for immigration after this three-year period.

It is thought likely that the Jewish State under the majority plan of partition would in fact not want to encourage unlimited immigration after the transitional period because of the serious economic difficulties which it would cause. It is also suggested that if, after two years or so, conditions in Europe became more prosperous and conditions in the Jewish State were economically difficult, as would very likely be the case, the pressure of would-be immigrants would very greatly decline. On the other hand, the Jewish Government would find it extremely difficult to stop would-be immigrants and the more extreme elements would no doubt still encourage a large flow of immigrants in order to increase the population of the Jewish State for aggressive reasons, i.e. in order

that in a few years' time they could claim that they had not sufficient living-room and must expand into neighbouring territories. ~~In any case,~~ the Arabs would never believe that Jewish immigration would automatically decrease or would be limited by a Jewish State. They would only be satisfied with limitation by an international authority.

It is impossible here to guess at the sort of figures on which a compromise might be reached. ~~If it were decided that we should at a later stage~~

possible at all -

take/

The absorptive capacity would be determined by an international commission consisting of 3 Arabs, 3 Jews & 3 UNO representatives.

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The Jewish Agency have often reiterated the view that it must be a cardinal point of the policy of a Jewish state to reach early accommodation with the Arab states. They might therefore try to resist extremist activities of this kind. But however this may be,

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But at the present stage it is unlikely they would be willing to commit themselves. If we did obtain a figure from them

It would be most useful to discover ~~take active steps to promote a compromise,~~ ~~the first step would be to try to ascertain~~ privately from the Jewish Agency what sort of figures of immigrants they expected during and after the transitional period. After reducing ^{it} this figure by a fairly large margin to allow for exaggeration and optimism, we might then discover what would be the Arab reaction to the idea of immigration limited to some such figure by international machinery.

(3) Constitutional changes.

These are perhaps likely to be less controversial than the two questions dealt with above. There will certainly be a large amount of room for negotiation with regard to the functions of the Economic Board, the allocation of Customs revenue, etc. If the powers of the Economic Board were much extended, one would arrive at some arrangement not far distant from a federal one, such as is proposed in the minority plan. If one wished to go as far as this, there would be much to be said for re-introducing something more like the cantonal scheme put forward by H.M.G. in February, 1947. This is the only sort of scheme which takes proper account of the diversified nature of settlement in Palestine. For both the UNSCOP plans, the division of Arab and Jewish inhabitants into several separate pockets is a fundamental disadvantage. It is in any case unnatural to divide Palestine; to divide it like a patchwork/

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patchwork quilt is far more so. But to pursue this line of thought would be to get away from the terms of reference, which are to base our

ideas on "variants of partition", & would incur as violent opposition from the Jews as does partition from the Arabs.

To sum up: ~~there is not much~~ Something can be done to mitigate the territorial unfairness of the majority plan, but this is not likely by itself to be enough to secure Arab-Jew agreement. The prospects in other directions are poor, unless there is a marked change of general attitude on both sides. The best way we can secure this is not to put forward any particular compromise proposals but to continue our present insistence on our own determination to withdraw & the difficulty of enforcing an unagreed settlement.

The C.O. are in general agreement.

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SECRET

Possible compromise settlements for Palestine.

The Secretary of State has suggested that we should begin to work out ourselves "possible compromise settlements" which would all presumably be variants of partition".

There are three main directions in which it is possible to modify the majority UNCOOP report:-

(1) Boundaries.

Mr. MacGillivray, of the Palestine Administration, who was attached to the United Nations Committee as liaison officer, has suggested that it would be possible to modify the majority plan boundaries in various ways so as to decrease considerably the number of Arabs in the Jewish State without significantly increasing the number of Jews in the Arab State. The proposed modifications are shown in the attached map and the advantages are described in the annexed paper prepared by Mr. MacGillivray for the Colonial Office. The total effect of the modifications proposed by Mr. MacGillivray (including the transfer of the Arab parts of Jaffa to the Arab State) would be that some 139,000 Arabs would be put inside the Arab State instead of inside the Jewish State, while about 3,000 Jews would be put inside the Arab State instead of the Jewish State. This would reduce the number of Arabs in the Jewish State from 497,000 to about 358,000. The number of Jews in the Arab State would be increased from about 10,000 to about 13,000. A rather larger proportion of Jewish-owned land would be transferred to the Arab State. The largest single modification would be one designed to make Jaffa part of the Arab State and to connect it with that State by a broad corridor. Jaffa must clearly remain Arab and the proposed corridor is almost totally Arab-inhabited. This modification has, however, the disadvantage of separating the Jewish coastal belt into two parts.

Mr. MacGillivray has suggested only one minor modification of the allocation of territory in the Beersheba sub-district and the Negeb. There are strong grounds for suggesting that the whole of this area should become part of the Arab State. It is inhabited by some 90,000 Arab Bedouin and has at present only small local Jewish settlements with about 1,000 Jewish inhabitants. This change, in addition to the modifications described above, would reduce the number of Arabs in the Jewish State to about 268,000. On the other hand, the Jews have given great publicity to their plans for making the southern desert blossom like the rose and regard it as the main area of expansion for the Jewish population. They have already spent large sums of money there on pipelines etc. It would therefore be a particularly hard change for them to accept.

If all the modifications described above were introduced we should have a major change in the statistical position, which might perhaps go some way towards meeting Arab objections based on the subjection of so many Arabs to a Jewish Government, though it will clearly not be enough to satisfy the Arabs. Any more extensive modification of

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the boundaries would result in bringing large numbers of Jews into the Arab State unless there were major exchanges of population.

The changes suggested by Mr. MacGillivray do nothing to alter the fundamental conception of the majority plan of two States, each composed of separate pieces of territory connected with each other only by narrow and artificial corridors. In fact, as mentioned, the Jaffa corridor makes this situation even worse by dividing one of the Jewish units into two. Communications within the Arab areas are, however, greatly improved without damage to Jewish communications, except in the case of the Jaffa corridor. On the other hand, the incorporation of Beersheba and the Negeb in the Arab State would improve the position considerably from this point of view by linking up two of the three separate pieces of Arab territory and reducing the pieces of Jewish territory from four (if the Arab Jaffa corridor is accepted) to three.

(2) Immigration.

From the Arab point of view, probably the most crucial difference between the majority and minority reports is that the former suggests that 150,000 Jews should be allowed to immigrate into the Jewish State during the two-year transitional period and implies that thereafter the amount of immigration into the Jewish State shall be decided by the Government of that State without any restriction. The minority report suggests that for three years from the beginning of the transitional period Jewish immigration shall take place into the Jewish area of the Federal State in such numbers as not to exceed the absorptive capacity of that area, having due regard to the rights of the population in the area and their anticipated natural rate of increase. The absorptive capacity would be determined by an international commission consisting of three Arabs, three Jews and three U.N.C. representatives. There is no specific provision for immigration after this three-year period.

It is thought likely that the Jewish State under the majority plan of partition would in fact not want to encourage unlimited immigration after the transitional period because of the serious economic difficulties which it would cause. It is also suggested that if, after two years or so, conditions in Europe became more prosperous and conditions in the Jewish State were economically difficult, as would very likely be the case, the pressure of would-be immigrants would very greatly decline. On the other hand, the Jewish Government would find it extremely difficult to stop would-be immigrants and the more extreme elements would no doubt still encourage a large flow of immigrants in order to increase the population of the Jewish State for aggressive reasons, i.e. in order that in a few years' time they could claim that they had not sufficient living-room and must expand into neighbouring territories. The Jewish Agency have often reiterated the view that it must be a cardinal point of the policy of a Jewish State to reach early accommodation with the Arab State. They might therefore try to resist extremist activities of this kind. But, however this may be, the Arabs would never believe that Jewish

immigration/

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immigration would automatically decrease or would be limited by a Jewish State. They would only be satisfied with limitation by an international authority.

It is impossible here to guess at the sort of figures on which a compromise might be reached, if indeed any agreed compromise on this point is possible at all. It would be most useful to discover privately from the Jewish Agency what sort of figures of immigrants they expected during and after the transitional period. But at the present stage it is unlikely they would be willing to commit themselves. If we did obtain a figure from them, we might, after reducing it by a fairly large margin to allow for exaggeration and optimism, discover what would be the Arab reaction to the idea of immigration limited to some such figure by international machinery.

(3) Constitutional changes.

These are perhaps likely to be less controversial than the two questions dealt with above. There will certainly be a large amount of room for negotiation with regard to the functions of the Economic Board, the allocation of Customs revenue, etc. If the powers of the Economic Board were much extended, one would arrive at some arrangement not far distant from a federal one, such as is proposed in the minority plan. If one wished to go as far as this, there would be much to be said for re-introducing something more like the cantonal scheme put forward by H.M.G. in February, 1947. This is the only sort of scheme which takes proper account of the diversified nature of settlement in Palestine. For both the UNSCOP plans, the division of Arab and Jewish inhabitants into several separate pockets is a fundamental disadvantage. It is in any case unnatural to divide Palestine; to divide it like a patchwork quilt is far more so. But to pursue this line of thought would be to get away from the terms of reference, which are to base our ideas on "variants of partition" and would incur as violent opposition from the Jews as does partition from the Arabs.

To sum up:

Something can be done to mitigate the territorial unfairness of the majority plan, but this is not likely by itself to be enough to secure Arab-Jew agreement. The prospects in other directions are poor, unless there is a marked change of general attitude on both sides. The best way we can secure this is not to put forward any particular compromise proposals, but to continue our present insistence on our own determination to withdraw and the difficulty of enforcing an unagreed settlement.

The Colonial Office are in general agreement.

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OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.,

21st October, 1947.

E 10412/951/31

SECRET

Dear Trafford Smith,

With reference to our telephone conversation, I enclose a tentative draft of a minute to the Foreign Secretary in response to his enquiry about our ideas on possible compromise settlements of Palestine.

I should be most grateful for any comments you may care to make and in particular for your confirmation that the figures in section (1) are roughly correct. I have assumed that the 70,000 inhabitants of Jaffa should be added to the total of the Arabs mentioned in McGillivray's paper to make the grand total of Arabs to be transferred from the Jewish to the Arab State under his plan.

As soon as I have heard from you, I intend to send the draft to Harold Beeley for any comments he may have, but we may easily have to submit it to the Secretary of State meanwhile. I should be most grateful if you could let me have your comments as soon as possible.

(Signed) B.A.B. Burrows.

Trafford Smith, Esq.,
Colonial Office.

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Burrows

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OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S. W. 1.

23rd October, 1947.

E10412/951/31

I enclose a copy of a paper on possible compromise settlements for Palestine which has been prepared in response to a request from the Secretary of State. We have discussed it with the Colonial Office, who are in general agreement. We should be very glad to have your comments as soon as possible.

(Signed) B.A.B. Burrows.

H. Beeley, Esq., C.B.E.,
U.K. Delegation,
New York.

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Reference:

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188

E

E 10431

23

1947

PALESTINE

7 NOV

Registry Number } E10431/951/31
TELEGRAM FROM
 No. U.A. Del
 Dated New York
 Received in Registry } 3226
 6 Nov
 7 ~

Sub Committee 1st.
 Under proposal now being considered, the security
 Council would be responsible for Palestine during
 period of transition. It seems possible that a proposal
 on this line may supplant the U.S. plan on basis
 for discussion in Political Committee. If such proposal
 were adopted, it would be needed. It would be
 our obligation as members of U.N. which would involve
 participation in plans of enforcement, over-side negotiations
 previously made on subject.

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

10412

References.

The Soviet proposal (E 10305/951/31) provides for the administration of Palestine to be taken over, during the transitional period after the abrogation of the Mandate, by the Security Council "which shall exercise the administration of Palestine through a special Commission composed of the representatives of the Member States of the Security Council, the seat of this Commission being in Palestine."

(Print.)

The Canadian proposal (E 10375/951/31) suggests that the Assembly should, in the light of the Mandatory Power's announcement of intention to withdraw from Palestine at an early date, request the Security Council by virtue of its authority under Articles 39 and 41 to take certain steps, listed as 1 to 6 on the second page of New York telegram No. 3217. The most immediately relevant of these steps would be for the Security Council "to make whatever arrangements are necessary to assist the Mandatory Power in the maintenance of order during the period prior to its withdrawal."

(How disposed of.)

8 Robertson, P.O.
 M.I. 3a.
 M.I. 4
 Colmby
 D.M.
 (on E10343) Nov 7

Adel New York, 3874
 12 Nov.
 8 M/expense
 80x Nov. 14

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

J.C.M. 14/11
 17/11/47

Next Paper.

E 10467

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

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The/

24

The present position with regard to the Military Staff Committee and the provision of forces is set out in the last paragraph of the Secretary of State's Minute to the Prime Minister of October 22nd in E 9966/951/31. The Committee is bogged down in an attempt to establish certain general principles and it is unlikely therefore that it would be in a position to provide forces to police Palestine. If we regard our obligations as members of the Security Council as overriding our reservations to an eventual Palestine settlement and agree to participate, we might find ourselves forced by the impotence of the Military Staff Committee to provide, not 10% of the forces required, but almost all the forces. No one has shown much alacrity in offering forces for this purpose so far.

The Colonial Office have no special views on this question and reasonably regard it as one for the Foreign Office. We should be grateful for the views of the United Nations Political Department on the United Nations angle. We do not wish to tie ourselves down to participate in enforcement before we see the shape of the settlement proposed: ~~but~~ it may very likely prove ~~difficult~~ difficult for us to evade our responsibilities as members of the Security Council in regard to any settlement which receives a two-third majority in the Assembly.

J.G.S. Beith

J.G.S. Beith

8th November, 1947

I understand that the P. G. S.'s first reaction is that we ought not to provide forces for the Security Council.

There is considerable force in Mr Beith's point at A above.

UN Pol Dept for OS for

J.G.S. Beith
P.X.1

1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

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INDEXED

fin O Jargens.

I attach a draft telegram in reply to New York telegram No. 3226. The draft has the concurrence of Mr. Fitzmaurice and U.N. (Political) Department. A copy has been sent to the Colonial Office for concurrence.

The Chiefs of Staff have not yet considered telegram M.S.C. 40 of November 6th (Flag A), but will do so almost at once. They would like to have a copy of our draft to help them. We have sent them a copy informally but would like to be able to tell them that it has your approval. The draft could then be submitted to the Secretary of State as soon as the Chiefs of Staff have concurred. We shall no doubt also have a chance of ~~commenting~~ on the reply which they would send to M.S.C. 40.

You will remember that, at the talk with Mr. Creech Jones, the Secretary of State said that his general view was that we should not make forces available to the Security Council. We have fortunately found good legal arguments for this course, which are incorporated in the draft telegram.

B.H. Jones

11th November, 1947.

H. J. K. 11

*Colonial Sec. concurs generally but
would rather like to see last
sentence*

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Minutes.

Sentence of 1st para. taken out.
He thinks it has been
sufficiently stated elsewhere.

to.
D. S. Bevis
NY. 12
(BEIT 14)

seen by S of L

Del sent.

JAB

12.11

26

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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The question in para. 3 of N. York telegram 3226 is based on a big "if", namely that the S. C. will be the body to look after the Settlements. I am not sure what line E. Dept are taking on this. I imagine they are resisting it?

2. I agree that if the S. C. is called in & consults the NSC (as it is ~~probably~~ well bound to) our obligations as members of the UN of the S. C. would involve our participation in plans of enforcement. But I do not see that it follows that we should have to provide British troops, if we were opposed to the settlement proposed. British troops would have to be provided as part of ^{our} quota, if UN troops existed. As they do ~~not~~

Nothing to be written in this margin.

surely not
written
the
case under
Art. 24
Cap. 7 of the
Statute
which is a
Special
agreement
under Art.
43. Para 1
02

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Reference:

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371 / 61887

not - yet - surely we are free to agree to
 or reject a proposal about "enforcement".
 If the above is right, I should have thought
 we would have welcomed the opportunity
 of participating in the plans of
 enforcement, in order to lead them
 in the right channels.

3. It would be useful incidentally to
 have an idea of the magnitude of the
 problem. How many troops and what
 etc will be needed?

I think legal advice should be also.

S. Abbott-Dwight
 8/11

But pl. see
 marginal comment -
 on previous page. If mesa-
 I agree. I should have
 thought the provisions of Chap. 8. 11.
 to provide force if called up by the
 S.C. only apply to cases determined by
 the S.C. under sub 29 of the Charter. So I
 think the answer to 3 is No. S.

What is boils down
 to, as I said, is that
 we are not yet formally
 committed to supply
 troops for this purpose.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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I

I now attach a draft tel. based on these minutes, which has been seen and agreed by Mr Fitzmaurice and the UN (Pol.) Dept.

I have sent a copy to Mr Mathieson Co. for concurrence. The Colonial Sec. has expressed a wish to see the draft.

H. S. Bent
Nov. 4

In P.P. 7.0. Minute Mr Burrows Nov 11.

JO Nov. 14

In P.P. R. F. Wood. My reference to R.D.C. McAlpine
13/11

[Signature]
13/11 P.T.O.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Minutes.

In P.P. C.R.O. line tel 894 1811

JANV. 21

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Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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7 NOV

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on.]

CYPHER/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3.226.

D: 11.34 a.m. 6th November, 1947.

6th November, 1947.

R: 4.48 p.m. 6th November, 1947.

Repeated to: High Commissioner Jerusalem,
Washington Saving.

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

SECRET

Palestine.

You will have seen that under both the Soviet and the Canadian proposal now being considered in Sub-Committee 1 the Security Council would be responsible for Palestine during the period of transition preceding the recognition of the independence of Arab and Jewish states. It seems possible that a proposal on these lines may supplant the United States plan as a basis for discussion in the Palestine Committee.

2. If such a proposal were adopted the Security Council might be asked to provide force and the Council in its turn might refer to the Military Staff Committee.

3. Would you in such circumstances consider that our obligations as a member of the United Nations and of the Security Council which would involve our participation in plans of enforcement and perhaps even the provision of a British contingent should over-ride the reservations we have previously made concerning our participation with others in the enforcement of a settlement in Palestine?

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 156.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetition to High Commissioner Jerusalem].

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Head of Eastern ³²

TOP SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

Received by O.T.P.

IMPORTANT

From : U.K. Delegation, New York.

MSC 40
TOD 061657Z
TOR 062235Z

To : Foreign Office.

MSC 40

6th November, 1947.

PALESTINE.

1. We have discussed with Sir A. Cadogan the question of a force to maintain peace in Palestine in the event of the General Assembly recommending a solution which is not acceptable to both Arabs and Jews and the British Forces in consequence being withdrawn. A telegram is being sent to the F.O. on this point (UKDIL NO 3226 of 6th Nov).
2. We have also discussed with Sir A Cadogan the danger we foresee of the Jewish State swinging strongly towards Communism and Russian dominance during the transition period. Unless the administration or control of the country and the force, if any, which is introduced in order to enforce the decisions of the general Assembly, are of such a nature as to prevent it, the Russians will, it seems to us, endeavour to introduce Communist-indoctrinated immigrants to the Jewish State and also to ensure the emergence of extreme left wing sections of the community as the controlling agency.
3. Sir A. Cadogan has suggested that it would be wise for us to draw your attention to these factors which you may like to consider in connection with the military implications of his own telegram to the F.O.
4. It seems to us that from the military point of view the transition period will be a most critical one for the future of Palestine since if control of that country gets into the wrong hands our strategic position in the Middle East will be still further undermined.

T00 061530.

CIRCULATION

D.C.O.R.
Foreign Office
First Sea Lord
Message Control W.O.
A.M.C.S.

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

Registry
No. E 10431/951/31

CYPHER

33

~~Top Secret~~
Secret.
~~Confidential~~
~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

OUT FILE

13 November, 1947.

Despatched 2 10a M.

Draft.

U.K. Delegation,
New York.

~~IMMEDIATE~~
~~SECRET~~

Your telegram No. 3226 [of November 6th:
Palestine].

Telegram.

No. 3874

(Date) Nov. 12/47

Repeat to:—

Jerusalem, ✓
Washington. 11708

We feel that the obligations imposed by
Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter in regard to
the provision of forces at the call of the
Security Council strictly apply only to enforce-
ment action in regard to cases determined by
the Security Council under Article 39 of the
Charter. Moreover, we read Article 43, para. 1,

as meaning that no specific obligation to
provide any particular force arises except in
accordance with a "special agreement" and none
has been concluded yet. As things are at
present, therefore, we could only be expected
to provide ~~provide~~ British troops on a voluntary
basis as our quota of a United Nations force, if
such a force actually existed and if we approved
of the purposes for which it was to be used.

The reservations referred to in para. 3 of your
telegram would not therefore be ~~overridden~~ ^{overridden} and
we should resist any pressure on us "as good
members of the United Nations" to provide British
forces for enforcement of a United Nations
settlement that did not comply with our essential
conditions. If we did provide any the whole
burden would, in practice, fall on us, as already
proposed under the American plan, and we should
in effect find ourselves the instrument of U.N.O.
for enforcing ~~the~~ ^a settlement whether we agreed

with/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Fair draft

Secured agreed
by Mr Fitzmaurice
U.N. (Pol.) Dept.

Copy sent to Co.
for concurrence

H.S. Beir
Nov. 11
(BEITH)

~~Ex Class.~~
Code
Cypher.

Distribution:—

World Organisation

RECEIVED IN C.B.

13 NOV 1947

SENT TO DEPT.

Copies to:—

Miny. (Defense)
Co.

Concur

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Reference:

FO

371

61887

with it or not. *Objections to this are set out more fully in ~~my tel. No. 40~~ a separate tel. We have seen your telegram MSC No. 40 of November 6th but have not yet received the comments of the Chiefs of Staff.*

2. It is important that the consideration of hypotheses like the present should not appear to deflect us in any way from our determination to enforce none (repeat none) but an agreed settlement.

3. We have seen your tel. MSC No. 40 of Nov. 6th and consulted Chiefs of Staff. They agree generally with the foregoing and would be grateful if you would show this tel. to the British military Staff Representative in reply to MSC No. 40.

[Seen by S. D. S.]

[Signature]

12.11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

35

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E 10431/951/31

Cypher/OTP

Secret

WORLD ORGANISATION
DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 5874

12th November, 1947

D: 2.10 a.m. 13th November, 1947

Repeated to: Jerusalem

Washington No. 11708

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

GIANT

Your telegram No. 5226 [of November 6th: Palestine].

We feel that the obligations imposed by Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter in regard to the provision of forces at the call of the Security Council strictly apply only to enforcement action in regard to cases determined by the Security Council under Article 39 of the Charter. Moreover, we read Article 43, paragraph 1, as meaning that no specific obligation to provide any particular force arises except in accordance with a "special agreement" and none has been concluded yet. As things are at present, therefore, we could only be expected to provide British troops on a voluntary basis as our quota of a United Nations force, if such a force actually existed and if we approved of the purposes for which it was to be used. The reservations referred to in paragraph 5 of your telegram would not therefore be overridden and we should resist any pressure on us "as good members of the United Nations" to provide British forces for enforcement of a United Nations settlement that did not comply with our essential conditions. If we did provide any the whole burden would, in practice, fall on us, as already proposed under the American plan, and we should in effect find ourselves the instrument of U.N.O. for enforcing a settlement whether we agreed with it or not. Objections to this are set out more fully in a separate telegram.

2. It is important that the consideration of hypotheses like the present should not appear to deflect us in any way from our determination to enforce none (repeat none) but an agreed settlement.

5. We have seen your telegram M.S.C. No. 40 of November 6th and consulted Chiefs of Staff. They agree generally with the foregoing and would be grateful if you would show this telegram to the British Military Staff Representative in reply to M.S.C. No. 40.

[Seen by Secretary of State].

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36



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
S.W.1.

Tel. No.: Whitehall 7000

Put with

E 10431 / 951 / 31 INDEXED

14 NOV 1947

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE
SECRETARY TO THE
MINISTER OF DEFENCE

13th November, 1947

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Reference:

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37

13th November, 1947

TOP SECRET

Dear McAlpine,

I write to confirm my message of last night. I have shown Mr. Alexander ^{two draft} telegrams about Palestine enclosed with Burrows' letter to Stapleton of yesterday and Mr. Alexander asked me to say that he concurs in both drafts.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Edmonds at the Colonial Office and also to Trafford Smith and Burrows.

Yours sincerely,

RICHARD F. WOOD

R.D.C. McAlpine, Esq.

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Reference:

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18 NOV 1947

Eastern Dept

CMCA 14/xi 38



E

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
GREAT GEORGE STREET,
S.W.1.

Tel. No.: Whitehall 7000

13th November, 1947

TOP SECRET

Dear McAlpine,

I write to confirm my message of last night. I have shown Mr. Alexander ^{the} two draft telegrams about Palestine enclosed with Burrows' letter to Stapleton of yesterday and Mr. Alexander asked me to say that he concurs in both drafts.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Edmonds at the Colonial Office and also to Trafford Smith and Burrows.

Yours sincerely,

R.D.C. McAlpine, Esq.

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With the Compliments of the
Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations.

This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and
the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it
to persons outside British and United States Government Services.

19 NOV 1947

39

P.W.
E

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

CYPHER (TYPEX)

E 10431 / 957 31
INDEXED
O.D.

TO: CANADA (GOVT.)
AUSTRALIA "
NEW ZEALAND ""
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 2.05 p.m. 18th Nov., 1947.)

D. No. 894 SECRET.

PALESTINE.

We have been examining legal aspects of question whether
our obligations as member of United Nations and of Security
Council involve provision of forces for implementation of
settlement in Palestine at call of Security Council.

2. In our view obligations imposed by Articles 42 and 43 of
Charter strictly apply only to enforcement action in regard to
cases determined by Security Council under Article 39 of Charter.
Moreover, we read Article 43, paragraph 1, as meaning that no
specific obligation to provide any particular force arises except
in accordance with a "special agreement" and none has been
concluded yet. As things are at present, therefore, we could only
be expected to provide United Kingdom troops on a voluntary basis
as our quota of a United Nations force, if such a force actually
existed and if we approved of purposes for which it was to be used.
3. Apart from considerations arising out of general lines of
our policy, we should therefore resist any pressure to provide
United Kingdom forces for enforcement of United Nations settlement
that did not (repeat not) comply with our essential conditions.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. I.A. Kirkpatrick
Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)
Mr. J.G.S. Beith
Mr. R. Arculus

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40

1947

PALESTINE

10 167

3 NOV

Registry Number

E10467/95/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

M Jackson Bogota

Dated

24.1

Received in Registry

6 Nov 8

Palestine M.M.G. Policy

instead of diplomatic action My Foreign Affairs requested material for a report on views of M.M.G. on partition and their reactions to different proposals at present being made as the future of Palestine. It was provided with lists of Colonial Secretaries speeches. Request received surprisingly with indifference at present.

Last Paper.

10431

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8 Malleson. P.O.

M.I.Pa.

MOA

Adm. Secy

G.M.

Nov 11

(Minutes.)

I think no further action is required. Any enquiries of this kind should be addressed by the ~~Commission~~ ^{Commission} representative to the U.N. to Sir A. Cadogan or, failing that, by the Mission here to us.

S. A Dept. first

Mrs. Denis Nov. 8

I feel that Bogota require some answer. Could we not tele them the gist of the above minute.

Am. Denis. 11/21.

Does not this tie up with the question of "briefing" South American delegates to U.N. about which U.N. Dept sent a circular to

(Action completed.)

P. E. W. 11/9

(Index)

11/21

Next Paper.

E10469

Wt. 24772/717 17805 10/35 F.O.P.

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References: FO 371 61887

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to Mr. Rips in all Latin American countries? I believe some material on Palestine was sent in connection with this circular, but of course the material may be out of date now. As regards Mr. Beit's point of the correct channel, I suggest it would be unwise to miss, on a technicality, any opportunity of providing the Colombian M.F.A. with our point of view, so that they may the more wisely brief their delegate to U.N. This was the idea behind the "briefing" circular. Do we not perhaps want to provide Mr. Jackson with more material while the M.F.A. is interested? Perhaps U.N. Dept. shd. see before we reply.

Summary
11/xi

U.N. (Pol) Dept.

I agree with Mr. Murray - but it is up to U.N. Dept. to decide (qua Palestine) if Colombia is important enough from the U.S. angle to be briefed further.

Shabbat (K...)

JB MW/24

41

In 004135/1/70
attached

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42
R

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM BOGOTA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Jackson.

No. 241

6th November, 1947

D. 6.23 p.m. 6th November, 1947
R. 12.24 a.m. 7th November, 1947

GIANT

Palestine.

10467

Head of Diplomatic Section of Ministry of Foreign Affairs today verbally requested me to provide him with material for a report on the views of His Majesty's Government on the partition, and their reactions to the different proposals at present being made on the future of Palestine.

2. I have provided him with copies of the Colonial Secretary's speeches of September 26th and October 16th which he did not possess, explaining that I had no official information on later developments.

3. The foregoing is reported for information, since the request, which was stated to be urgent, contrasts surprisingly with the indifference hitherto shown in such matters by the Government authorities.

4. Please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York].

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1947

PALESTINE

E 10469

3 NOV

Registry Number

E 10469/951/PA

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Sir A. Cadogan
U.K. Dec

Dated

New York

Received in Registry

3249
7 Nov
8

Palistin, 14 Nov Policy
in Pearson and Mr. Harold Johnson, asked
Sir A. Cadogan, to call to discuss Palistin
papers table of conversation
asked for comment, and indication of
what he might say officially

Last Paper.

10467

References.

18/11

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Matheson, 60.

M. 13a.

M04

Admby

Q.M.

Nov.

apt. Lufford Smith
60.

✓ 10, Nov
P.T.O.

(Action completed.)

G. E. 20/11

(Index.)

[Signature]

Next Paper.

E 10472

(Minutes.)

We should be able to send Sir A.
Cadogan some more categorical
instructions about a date of
withdrawal as a result of
yesterday's Defence Committee.

J.P. Sims

Nov. 8

In P.P. 70. Matheson M. Pearson 8/11

11/11

JB Nov. 17

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[Faint, illegible markings]

44

Del. J.K. Aet.
New York.
3863

Repl'd W'ron
11685
Nov 12.

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Reference:

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Sir O. Sargent

I attach drafts of

- (a) A personal tel. to Mr McNeil.
- (b) A minute to the PM
- (c) A tel. to Sir A. Cadogan.

As soon as you send the papers
(incorporating any changes you wish to make)
back a copy of (c) will be sent
to the Colonial Office for Mr
Creech-Jones to see. He wants to
have it by 10 a.m. Monday.

The drafts would then be submitted
to the S. of S. as soon as we
have heard that Mr Creech-Jones
consents.

Excellent! I have
made

B. B. Benson
8.11

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Reference:

FO

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61887

made a few amendments,
 will ~~to~~ have this tel
 to sufficient answer to
 the later N.Y. tel no 3249 (attached)?
 Let me see your
 reply to N.Y. tel
 no 3226 (which I don't
 seem to have had in
 my distribution). By
 the way that is to
 curious tel out from
 N.Y. entitled TSC 40 (attached)?
 It too will need

answering
 Could you let me
 have the Defense Counsel's
 conclusions of Nov 9.

OP Nov 9

The main tel. to New York has
 at last gone off, unaltered.
 I now attach a further reply
 to

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Reference:

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61887

No 3249, which has been agreed by C.O.

I have already sent you a draft reply to 3226, which deals also with MSC 40.

BAB Ingrams

11.11

890
150512

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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Reference:

FO

371

61887

M. Burrows

48

Tel. to New York
despatched. I made it
"Immediate".

A. A. D. Montague Browne
12/11

A. A. D. MONTAGUE BROWNE.

[Handwritten initials]

12/11

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

Sir A Cadogan,
No. 3249
7th November, 1947.

D: 5.25 p.m. 7th November, 1947
R: 11.15 p.m. 7th November, 1947.

Repeated to Washington
Jerusalem.

10:09
8 NOV

IMMEDIATE.

Following from Sir A. Cadogan.

1. Mr. Pearson and Mr. Herschel Johnson asked me to come and see them this morning about Palestine.
2. The working group is making small if any progress. They hope to eliminate the Guatemalan proposal but do not see their way to proceed beyond that point.
3. It became clear that both Mr. Pearson and Mr. Johnson hoped at the best to get agreement on the lines of the United States proposal and that their object was to get some further clarification of the attitude of His Majesty's Government which might assist to that end.
4. They said that difficulty was caused in some quarters by the belief or suspicion that His Majesty's Government would be completely "non-cooperative", would not consult with the United Nations Commission or even perhaps inform it of their plans and might even not assume any responsibility for maintenance of law and order.
5. I told them I could make no categorical or detailed statement at the moment. As they know we were resolved to withdraw at the earliest possible moment though I could give them no indication of our estimate of the date of completion of withdrawal.
6. With regard to maintenance of law and order I said that speaking personally I supposed that we should continue to assume this responsibility in areas where we remained in occupation but that we should divest ourselves of it as regards areas from which we withdrew as and when we evacuated them. I should further suppose that we should not allow that disorders in areas from which we had withdrawn could retard or reverse our withdrawal. They seemed to think that this was not unreasonable.

/7.

NOV 8 11 11 AM '47
NEW YORK

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Reference: FO 371 / 61887

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7. As for "cooperation" in other respects I had nothing definite to say but here again I supposed that when the time came we should give the United Nations Commission such assistance as we could in the way of advance warning of moves and our experience and advice would be at its disposal.

8. Mr. Pearson asked Mr. Johnson whether he on his side could give any clarification that might assist. Mr. Johnson said that his Government would be ready in the evacuated areas to provide experts and advisers who would help to organise constabulary public services etc. They would not (repeat not) send any American troops. They would, however, be ready to declare that if the United Nations found that there was aggression from outside either on land or from the sea the United States would be ready to play its part as a member of the United Nations.

9. The upshot of all this was that if we could make clearer what our view was as to the extent of our continuing responsibility or at least as to the stages of our renunciation of it it might be easier for the working group to reach a conclusion. They both seemed anxious to defeat the Soviet proposal which they considered completely unworkable. Their criticism of the Soviet proposal was that it would mean that on January 1st His Majesty's Government would cease to have the authority or responsibility of mandatory but that British troops would for so long as they remained be at the disposal of the Security Council Commission.

10. Mr. Pearson told me afterwards that he feared the working group would not reach an agreed recommendation but would send all 3 proposals to the Sub Committee who would probably do no better. It would then be up to the Ad Hoc Committee itself to try to find a solution.

11. Working group meets again tomorrow morning and the Sub Committee, Mr Pearson hopes, in the afternoon.

12. I should be grateful to receive your comments at the earliest possible moment with, if possible, indication of what I might say officially. I made it quite clear this morning that I was not talking on any explicit instructions.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No.158.

[Copies sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

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OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.,

10th November, 1947.

E10469/951/31

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Trafford Smith,

I enclose a draft telegram in reply to Cadogan's telegram No. 3249. The telegram referred to in paragraph 1 of the draft is the one which we hope will go off to-night or to-morrow, giving the Defence Committee conclusions. We will let you see as soon as possible drafts in reply to New York telegrams Nos. 3226 and 3270.

(Signed) B.A.B. BURROWS.

Trafford Smith, Esq.,
Colonial Office.

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Reference:

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61887

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58

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry
No. 10469/951/31

B. A. B. B.

Draft:

U.K. Delegation,
New York.

Telegram.

No. 3863 ✓

Dated. Nov. 12

Repeat to:

Washington 11685 ✓

Jerusalem ✓

• Co. agree

Cypher

World Organisation

RECEIVED IN C.B.

13 NOV 1947

SENT TO DEPT.

CYPHER

November, 1947

Despatched 12/11

12 30 PM 52

OUT FILE ✓

~~IMPORTANT~~ Immediate
CONFIDENTIAL

GIANT

Your telegram No. 3249 [of 7th
November: Palestine].

My telegram No. 3852 will have
basis for given you the lines of any official
statement which you may wish to make
either in public or to United States
or Dominions representatives. I
approve the line you took in paragraph
6. We cannot at present say anything
further about the phasing of our
withdrawal and we are unlikely to have
our plans in a more definite state for
a week or so.

2. I am replying separately to
Minister of State's telegram No. 3270.

and your tel. No 3308.

Handwritten signature

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OUT FILE

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10469/951/31

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK.

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3865

12th November 1947. D.12.30 p.m. 12th November 1947
Repeated to Washington No. 11685
Jerusalem.

IMMEDIATE.
CONFIDENTIAL.
GIANT

Your telegram No. 3249 [of 7th November:
Palestine].

My telegram No. 3852 will have given you the basis for any statement which you may wish to make either in public or to United States or Dominions representatives. I approve the line you took in paragraph 6. We cannot at present say anything further about the phasing of our withdrawal and we are unlikely to have our plans in a more definite state for a week or so.

2. I am replying separately to Minister of State's telegram No. 3270 and your telegram No. 3508.

V V V

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Reference: **FO**
371 / 61887

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10472

1947

PALESTINE

3 NOV

Registry Number

E10472/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.S. Del New York

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

3252
7 Nov
8 -

Palstine, Financial Obligations

Reps New York tel 3114 (E10142/957/31) are being prepared to provide estimate of financial obligations referred to in Para 3 of rep. Rough estimate will suffice if nothing better immediately available. In particular, supply details regarding Public Debt.

Last Paper.

10469

References.

(Minutes.)

E.R. September 11/4

J.B.M.V.P

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

*8, Hathorn. 80.
M.I. 3a.
M04/
Admty
Q.M.
Nov 11
(~~on file~~)
E10467*

(Action completed.)

G.E.W. 12/11

(Index)

[Handwritten initials]

Next Paper.

E10492

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References: **FO** 371 / 61887

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10772

1947

PALESTINE

3 NOV

Registry Number E10472/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No. U.M. Del New York.

Dated 3252.

Received in Registry 7 Nov 8 -

Palatins, Financial Obligations
Refer New York tel 3114 (E10142/957/31) Mr
being prepared to produce estimate of financial
obligations referred to - Para 3 of ref.
Rough estimate will suffice if nothing better
immediately available. In particular, supply
details regarding Public Debt.

Last Paper.

10469

(Minutes.)

References.

E.R. Sept 11/11

J.B.M.V.P

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Wathman. 80.
M.I. 3a
1104
Admty
Q.M.
Nov 11
(~~Am. 10467~~)
E10467

(Action completed.)

(Index)

G.E.W. 12/11

11/9/4

Next Paper.

E10492

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1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference: FO 371 / 61887

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E 10172 UN

Cypher/OTP

3 NON-DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3252

D. 6.23 p.m. 7th November 1947
R. 11.31 p.m. 7th November 1947

7th November 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington (Saving)

IMMEDIATE

Following for Trafford Smith, Colonial Office
from Martin.

E 10172 / 951 / 31

We are being pressed to produce estimate of
financial obligations referred to in paragraph 3 of
our telegram to Jerusalem No. 128 repeated to Foreign
Office No. 3114. Shall be grateful if you will
expedite if it has now reached Colonial Office. Rough
estimate would suffice if nothing better is immediately
available. In particular, please supply details as
regards Public Debt.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my
telegram No. 159.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetition to
Jerusalem].

[Copies sent to Colonial Office for Trafford
Smith].

ccc



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Reference:

FO

371 / 61887

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10 1947

1947

PALESTINE

NOV

Registry Number } E10492/951/51
 FROM C.A.F. Dundas
 No. Damascus
 Dated 26/239/47
 Received in Registry } 30 Oct
 10 Nov

Syria - Political Frontiers

During the non-critical - Jerusalem of
 Damascus tel 74 (E9500/951/11) - and understanding
 has been gained. Between Damascus and Jerusalem
 from Damascus end it seems that Syrian Army
 is no threat to anybody and if left to itself
 will get its link and stay away. But if
 an army is made of recent manoeuvres they
 are likely to keep an independence making force
 at the start.

Last Paper.

10472

References.

(Minutes.)
 Services Liaison Dept.)
 Personnel Dept.) para. 2

We hope now to get
 a M.A. for Beirut - Damascus.
 We are seeking try. sanction.

J. Beris
 W.V. 10

P. Carran
 10/21

JABIS

11.11

(Action completed.)

J.P.M. 19/11

(Index)

J.P.M. 1/9/48

Next Paper.

10495

The M.A. post at Beirut has (covering also
 Damascus) has been reinstated. The new
 incumbent should take up his duties early
 in the New Year. The 'AMA', Major Brooker,
 is acting meanwhile. M.A. Wanner 15/11
 (WANNER) 19/11

32003 F.O.P

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Reference:

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61887

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10 1947

10 NOV

26/239/47.

British Legation,
Damascus.

30th Oct., 1947.

enter 57

Dear Burrows,

You will have seen by the recent exchange of telegrams between this post, Jerusalem and our respective Secretaries of State that the High Commissioner and myself are at cross purposes. Much of this misunderstanding was, I think, caused by the non-arrival in Jerusalem of my telegram No. 74 to Jerusalem (No. 439 to the Foreign Office) of October 11th. I very much regret the waste of time and energy which our different view points have occasioned. From this end it does seem that the Syrian army is no threat to anybody, and if left to itself for a few more weeks there is a reasonable chance that it will pack up its tents and steal away. I fear, however, that if we make an "issue" of their manoeuvres they are likely to keep on indefinitely "making faces at the Jews".

It is very unfortunate that we have lost our military attache at this moment as he could have been very useful smoothing ruffled plumage on both sides of the frontier - instead I find myself committed to accompanying the Syrian Minister of Defence next Friday on a wild boar hunt which after all is preeminently an occupation for a Military Attache.

B.A.B. Burrows, Esq.,
Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W.1.

Zouss
C.A.F. Dundas

*no sign that
it was repeated from
and copy*

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E 10495

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PALESTINE

10 NOV

Registry Number

E10495/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. Del

No.

New York

Dated

3280

Received in Registry

8 Nov

10 -

Collection Sub Committee One.

has list of questions asked at private meeting of informal working group on implementation by Pan-Arabic delegate, Under-Secretary Gen. U.S. and Soviet delegates received their replies which will be given at further meeting.

Last Paper.

10492.

References.

(Minutes.)

This has now led to revised proposals by the working group on implementation

10 Nov. 11

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Hathern. B.O.
M.I. Pa
M.O. 4
Admky
A.M.
Nov 11

(on E10467)

(Action completed.)

G.L. 11/11

(Index.)

11/11/11

Next Paper.

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Reference:

FO

371

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E 59

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Cypher/OTP WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 5280 D. 1.23 a.m. 9th November, 1947
8th November, 1947 R. 6.55 a.m. 9th November, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem and Washington

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

SECRET

10495
10 NOV

Palestine Sub-Committee I.

At private meeting today of informal working group on implementation following questions were asked by Canadian delegate. Understand that United States and Soviet delegates reserved their replies, which will be given at further meeting tomorrow or Monday morning.

.First question (To U.S.A.).

Would the U.S.A. agree to recommend the termination of the mandate on January 1st, 1948, if satisfactory arrangements could be worked out with the Mandatory Power, and the United Nations, for the preservation of law and order and essential services in Palestine from the above date until, say, July 1948, when the two new independent States are recognised?

Second question (to U.S.S.R.).

If the mandate terminates on January 1st, 1948, will the U.S.S.R. recognise the necessity for immediate discussions, to be conducted by the "working group" or in some other manner, with the United Kingdom in order to ascertain whether the United Kingdom will accept certain responsibilities as the agent of the United Nations, for the preservation of law and order in the period January-July, 1948?

Third question (To U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.).

Would the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. agree that, instead of an 11-member commission in Palestine acting for the Security Council, this Commission should consist of three only, to be appointed in one of the following ways:

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(I) By the Assembly, with the Commissioners appointed in their personal capacities, but after appointment to be responsible to the Security Council.

(II) By the Assembly, but to report to the Security Council.

(III) By the Security Council with the Commissioners acting as experts.

(IV) By the Security Council nominating three of its member Governments to form the commission by appointing representatives.

30101

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No.165.

VOM [Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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Reference:

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E 10496
10 NOV

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 10496/971/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. 231

No.

New York.

Dated

3281

Received in Registry

8 Nov
10 -

Palatine Sub Committee Ins.
Refers New York tel. 3206 (E10338/971/31) Report of working group on Economics was circulated 5, Nov, and I said in Secretary of Sub Committee on 7th note containing partial comment on this report. The was circulated evening of 7th with new report of working group. *Sever's comments*

Last Paper.

(Minutes.)

10495

References.

A significant remark by the Chairman in para. 3 referring to immigration pressure. He is clearly not friendly towards this country.

*D.S. Beint
Nov. 11*

*R. J. Farrer
11/11*

*B.A.S.B.
11.11*

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

*8, Matheson BU
M.I.Pc.
1104
Admty
O.M.
Nov. 11
(on E 10467)*

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

*J.C.M. 12/11
9/19/48*

Next Paper.

E 10516

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Reference: **FO** 371 61887

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EN CLAIR.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

62

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3281.

D. 2.32 a.m. 9th November 1947.

8th November 1947.

R. 8.40 a.m. 9th November 1947.

Repeated (Saving) to Washington and Jerusalem.

GIANT.

Palestine Sub-Committee 1.

Paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 3206.

10496
10 NOV

Report of Working Group on boundaries was circulated on 5th November. The United Kingdom Delegation handed to the Secretary of the Sub-Committee on 7th November a note containing factual comments on this report. This was circulated to members yesterday evening together with revised report of Working Group.

2. When the Sub-Committee met this afternoon to discuss boundaries the Czechoslovak delegate said that he had not had time to study the United Kingdom paper. From a glance at it he noted apparent discrepancies between it and the report of the Working Group, for example it indicated considerable cultivation in one area which the Working Group stated was entirely uncultivated. The paper required thorough study. The daily lives of human beings were involved in this question of boundaries and he for one was not prepared to give a decision on the modifications proposed until he had examined all the relevant facts.

3. The Chairman said that it was a pity the proposals of the Mandatory Power had not been received before. The Working Group had had full discussions but had not at their meetings received observations from the Mandatory Power. There was danger that if there was further delay in considering the matter the Palestine problem would not be settled and it should be remembered that there were thousands of human beings waiting till the time when the doors of Palestine would be open to them. He thought therefore that the objections of the Mandatory Power should be discussed at once.

4. The United Kingdom representative pointed out that his Delegation had not been invited to take part in the Working Group and that the report of the Group had been received only on 5th November. He explained that the United Kingdom note contained neither proposals nor objections. It contained factual comment put forward simply with the desire to be helpful. Just as the United Kingdom was not putting forward any particular

solution

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Reference: FO

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61887

solution for the problem of Palestine so they did not propose to suggest any particular boundary alignment.

They considered, however, that it was their duty to put at the Sub-Committee's disposal any information in their possession which appeared to be relevant to consideration of this question.

5. The Chairman thanked the United Kingdom representative for his explanation and asked him if he thought the Sub-Committee could now go forward at once with an examination of the proposed modifications. The United Kingdom representative replied that this appeared to be a matter for the members of the Committee to decide but that personally he saw no reason why the examination should not proceed immediately. The Czechoslovak delegate repeated his objections.

6. Shertek here interposed an explanation of the apparent discrepancy of fact which Lisicky had noted. The words "the entire area is uncultivated" had crept into the report in error in place of the words "mostly uncultivated". As regards the rest of the United Kingdom note apart from one relevant point correcting a population figure in one area it was simply a recitation of the names of villages whose lands were divided by the revised boundary lines. The Jewish Agency had already explained that they did not agree with the UNSCOP view that it was necessary as far as possible to follow village boundaries. He suggested therefore that the Sub-Committee's work need not be held up for a study of the United Kingdom note.

7. Lisicky stuck to his point and received support from the United States and Venezuela.

8. The Chairman suggested that since the United Kingdom note was silent on the question of Jaffa they could proceed to discuss this question at once, but the Soviet delegate objected on the grounds that it was necessary to consider boundary alterations as a whole. Discussion then passed to the problem of the future administration of Jerusalem in regard to which see separate telegram.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No.164.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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Reference:

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371 / 61887

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10 NOV

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E10516/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

U.H. Del
New York.

Dated

Received in Registry

3266
8, Nov
10 -

Palestine Liberation

Refer 40 tel 3791. H/C. comment in his telegram 1519 of Nov 5 are very helpful. As regards suggestion in para 3 do not think that in the absence of adoption of resolution or any other action at this session there would be any possibility of securing agreement on the appointment of a U.N. authority to whom we could transfer responsibility.

Last Paper.

10496

(Minutes.)

References.

This has been held up for the reference to be traced. It is still relevant.

J.S. Beins
Nov. 19

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Whatchman. C.O.
M.I. 3a.
M.O. 4.
Adopted
p.m.
✓ Nov 12
8, G. B. Hart
Nov. 12

JMB
23. 11

(Action completed.)

DP
7/11/62

(Index.)

1/9/68

Next Paper.

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Reference: FO 371/61887

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10516 65

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Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE
(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3266 D. 12.43 p.m. 8th November, 1947
8th November, 1947. R. 6.30 p.m. 8th November, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington

IMPORTANT
SECRET

*from files
2/11/5/11*

Your telegram No. 3791.

^ E1047/46/9.

High Commissioner's comments in his telegram No. 1519 of 5th November are very helpful. As regards suggestions in paragraph 3 however we do not think that, in the absence of adoption of partition or any other solution at this session, there could be any possibility of securing agreement on the appointment of a U.N. authority to whom we could transfer responsibility. In any case, as things are, we could not count on such a commission being "impartial" and possibility of appointment of Commissioners such as Granados (who is playing very active part in the discussions here) or Fabregat cannot be excluded.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 160.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

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PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 10517/921/51

TELEGRAM FROM

UKAEC

No.

New York

Dated

3283

Received in Registry

9 Nov

11 -

*Political Dept Committee 3283
Report New York 3281 (10/11/47)
Discussion of committee of Jerusalem...
proposal by majority that the city should
be under some special international régime but that
the main part of Jerusalem should be an
extension of the Jewish state which Arab part
included in the Arab State.*

Last Paper.

10516

(Minutes.)

The Colonial Office have now drafted a reply to Mr. Martin's telegram No. 3221 from New York in E 10376. This draft expresses general agreement with the view of the High Commissioner (to be found in E 10522) *and* points to the strong arguments for maintaining Jerusalem and its surroundings as a special area under international administration.

References.

(Print.)

Mr. Trafford Smith rang me up and asked whether we agreed with the line taken by the Colonial Office. I told him that I thought that the arguments for sticking to the majority plan in regard to Jerusalem and rejecting the Jewish claim to cut off "New Jerusalem" were strong. Nevertheless, we could not look at the question quite dispassionately and any expression of opinion by us should be related to our intention to withdraw. I reminded him of the last sentence in the O.C.P. paper on Jerusalem which runs as follows:-

(How disposed of.)

*8, Whatcheran CO.
M.I. 3a
M.O. 4
Admiralty
A. P.
Nov 11
(see E 10467)*

"The U.N. S.C.O.P. report shows that Jerusalem is already recognized as presenting a peculiar problem and that any emphasis which we might add to this conception would only increase the probability that we should be asked to share in the burden of protecting Jerusalem after we should, in other circumstances, have been able to complete our withdrawal". Mr. Trafford Smith agreed that, in the light of this consideration, his Department should not hurry forward with the preparation of a draft statute for Jerusalem. He agreed that, if we ourselves put up any plan of this kind, it would be likely to involve us in its implementation.

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

*J.L.M. 14/11
19/11*

J.G.S. Beith

J.G.S. Beith
12th November 1947.

*L.P.L. Pagan
L.C. Pagan 13/11*

Next Paper.

E 10522

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Reference: FO 371/61887

*3283
13.14*

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PALESTINE

10 NOV

Registry Number

E 10517/921/51

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. Adol

No.

New York

Dated

3283

Received in Registry

9 Nov

11 -

*Not let back Committee ...
After New York tel 3281 (E 10517/921/51)
Discussion of proposals of Jerusalem ...
proposal by ... that the old city should
be under some special international ... but that
the main part of new Jerusalem should be an
extension of the Jewish state ... Arab part
included in the Arab State.*

Last Paper.

10516

References.

(Minutes.)

The Colonial Office have now drafted a reply to Mr. Martin's telegram No. 3221 from New York in E 10376. This draft expresses general agreement with the view of the High Commissioner (to be found in E 10522) ~~and~~ points to the strong arguments for maintaining Jerusalem and its surroundings as a special area under international administration.

(Print.)

Mr. Trafford Smith rang me up and asked whether we agreed with the line taken by the Colonial Office. I told him that I thought that the arguments for sticking to the majority plan in regard to Jerusalem and rejecting the Jewish claim to cut off "New Jerusalem" were strong. Nevertheless, we could not look at the question quite dispassionately and any expression of opinion by us should be related to our intention to withdraw. I reminded him of the last sentence in the O.C.P. paper on Jerusalem which runs as follows:-

(How disposed of.)

*8, Whatheron CO.
M.I. 3a
M.O. 4
Adapted
a. pt.
Nov 11
(on E 10467)*

"The U.N. S.C.O.P. report shows that Jerusalem is already recognized as presenting a peculiar problem and that any emphasis which we might add to this conception would only increase the probability that we should be asked to share in the burden of protecting Jerusalem after we should, in other circumstances, have been able to complete our withdrawal". Mr. Trafford Smith agreed that, in the light of this consideration, his Department should not hurry forward with the preparation of a draft statute for Jerusalem. He agreed that, if we ourselves put up any plan of this kind, it would be likely to involve us in its implementation.

(Action completed.)

J.L.M. 14/11

Next Paper.

E 10522

J.G.S. Beith

J.G.S. Beith
12th November 1947.

L.P.L. Pyman

L.P.L. PYMAN 13/11

B. 2. 3

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Reference:

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61887

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En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3283
9th November, 1947.

D. Untimed
R. 8.25 a.m.

9th November, 1947
10th November, 1947.

Repeated to Washington,
Palestine.

Palestine sub-committee.1.

My telegram No. 3281.

10517

10 NOV

Discussion of administration of Jerusalem opened with proposal by Fabregat that the old city should be under some special international régime but that the Jewish part of new Jerusalem should be an enclave of the Jewish State and the Arab part included in the Arab State. Herschel Johnson said that his delegation was not much attracted to the idea that the old city by itself should be under international administration and suggested that before there was further discussion the views of the United Kingdom should be heard. The Chairman agreed that it would be helpful to have the views of the United Kingdom and also those of the Jewish agency.

2. The United Kingdom representative replied that on this subject as on others his delegation was not present to put forward views but was glad to give any information relevant to its consideration. He then gave population figures of the various sections of Jerusalem and made mention of the Holy Place situated outside the Old City. He also gave brief accounts of:

(a) The dependence of the Old City both as a place of pilgrimage and as a market centre upon new Jerusalem and upon surrounding rural areas;

(b) Common public services which were inseparable pointing out the need for some special administrative arrangements for these services should the city be divided into separate administrative units and

(c) The administration difficulties which would arise from divided loyalties should residents of any area under a special administrative régime have political rights and allegiances outside that area. He added that he did not propose to comment on the U.N.E.S.C.O.P. proposal to apply the trusteeship system in accordance with the Charter but suggested that the applicability of this system should be closely examined.

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

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3. Shertok then presented the Jewish Agency's case for inclusion of the Jewish part of new Jerusalem in the Jewish State and the placing of the old city under an international régime. He simply recapitulated at greater length the arguments already adduced by Silver and himself in earlier speeches adding the point that if the whole of Jerusalem were to come under international control "by virtue of its sanctity" religious interests would be overriding and the economic development of the new Jerusalem might be retarded: he also indicated cautious appreciation of the United Kingdom representative's point about divided loyalties.

4. Fabregat explained evidently with reference to the mention by the United Kingdom delegate of Holy places outside the old city that his proposal envisaged a special "religious and civilian" régime not only for the old city but also for Bethelhem and other Holy places. Lisicky asked what this meant. Was an extra-territorial régime intended? He got no clear reply from Fabregat but later the chairman in giving support to the proposal of the delegate of Uruguay suggested a régime similar to that of the Vatican City, the jurisdiction of which he pointed out was not confined to a single territorial unit. He added that the arrangement proposed would provide the Arab state with its natural capital and suggested that it was one upon which both Arab and Jews might easily find agreement. The Soviet delegate also supported the Uruguay proposal and suggested that all three religions should be represented in the administration of the old city and other holy places.

5. The United States representative said that his declaration would not now express a final opinion but that he personally inclined towards the U.N.S.C.O.P. plan and would be glad to hear from a member of U.N.S.C.O.P. the reason for their recommendation. Lisicky explained briefly that U.N.S.C.O.P. had been influenced by (a) the desire to avoid enclaves, (b) the need for creating a special area around Jerusalem which would be reasonably viable, and (c) the wish to include Bethelhem within it. He was not himself in favour of the U.N.S.C.O.P. proposals.

6. The delegate of Venezuela suggested that this was a matter on which the Arab Higher Committee might be willing to express views. There was no response to this suggestion from other members of the sub-committee.

7. The chairman then asked Lisicky to redraft the U.N.S.C.O.P. recommendations and present concise proposals. Lisicky reluctantly said that he would do so if the sub-committee would first decide on the form of special régime for the old city.

Fabregat said that it might take one of several forms and the Soviet delegate suggested that the sub-committee should entrust to Lisicky and Fabregat together the task of submitting definite proposals. The Czechoslovak delegate made no further attempt to obtain a more precise mandate and the meeting closed.

Foreign Office please pass to Palestine as my telegram No.166.
[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

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10546 69

1947

PALESTINE

NOV

Registry Number

E10546/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. Adm

No.

New York

Dated

3307

Received in Registry

10 Nov

11

Palastine Arab Committee Inc.
at afternoon meeting secretary read out draft proposals prepared by the Working group on implementation. Pearson gave a general explanation pointing out that they were not yet complete and he and I needed working out a greater detail. Further comment by delegates.

Last Paper.

10522

References.

(Minutes.)

Mr Pearson seems to have been the only delegate who saw any of the difficulties inherent in these unrealistic arrangements.

Sir A. Cadogan now has full instructions which should enable him to inject more reality into the discussions at an early stage

U.N. (Pol.) Dept.
J.A. 17/11

Jas. Beins
Nov. 13
(BEITH)

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8. Mathison. 60
M. 1.3 a.
M. 0.4
Admly
A.M.
Nov 12
(on E10516/951/31)

(Action completed.)

J.G.M. 17/11

(Index.)

[Signature]

Next Paper.

E 10582

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11 NOV

WORLD ORGANISATION
DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3507

D. 2.10 a.m. 11th November, 1947.

10th November, 1947.

R. 7.50 a.m. 11th November, 1947.

Repeated to : Jerusalem
Washington - Saving

MOST IMMEDIATE

GIANT

When Palestine Sub-Committee One met this afternoon the secretary read out the draft proposals prepared by the Working Group on implementation, the text of which has been telegraphed separately. At the Chairman's request Pearson then gave a general explanation of these proposals pointing out that they were not yet complete and that there still remained to the Working Group the task of working out paragraphs 4 and 7 in greater detail. He stated that the proposals assumed that on 1st May, 1948, some other authority would be ready to step in and take over control from the Mandatory Power and that preliminary steps would be taken to this end by the General Assembly. He added that all the members of the Working Group hoped that the period between the termination of the Mandate on 1st May and the assumption of independence by the two States would be shorter than two months. July 1st was proposed as the latest date for independence.

2. There followed speeches of mutual congratulation and appreciation by the United States, Soviet and Guatemalan representatives. The Soviet delegate emphasised that the original draft Soviet proposals of 3rd November had been taken as a basis for the present agreed proposals and that in regard to the functions of the proposed Commission there had been agreement on points 5 to 10 inclusive of this original Soviet draft.

3. Martin said that the proposals would be communicated to his Government but that there were two points on which he thought His Majesty's Government would wish to have some clarification:

(A) Was it intended that the United Kingdom should be responsible for law and order up to 1st May and should also complete withdrawal of troops by that date? To this point the United States' representative replied that it seemed to him obvious that the withdrawal must be carried out by degrees and that some troops would have to be left on 1st May but that arrangements could be made for them to get out as soon as possible thereafter. Later the Soviet representative said that the Working Group had visualised a progressive withdrawal on the understanding that on 1st May all British troops would have left Palestinian territory. Before that time some local militia would have been formed to replace them and authority established to take over all essential services.

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

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(B) In paragraph 5 of the proposals what assistance to the Mandatory was contemplated? In reply to this question Granados made reference to the tenth point of the Soviet proposals of 3rd November and suggested that the Mandatory would require the assistance of the local militia progressively as it was formed, assistance might also be required in maintaining public services. The Canadian representative said that this was a clear and correct answer to the question but suggested that assistance might additionally be given in another direction. Developments inside or outside Palestine on land or water might be prejudicial to peace and order and of such dimensions that the Mandatory would not be able alone to check them. The Commission would then have to report these developments to the Security Council which if they regarded them as constituting a threat to peace and good order would thereupon take action.

4. Shertok, after expressing satisfaction with and admiration for the efforts of the Working Group, asked for clarification on two points:

(1) On what date would the Commission take up its functions in Palestine? The delegates of Guatemala and the Soviet Union explained that it was intended that the Commission should leave for Palestine and take up its functions as seen as appointed by the General Assembly.

(2) Would the functions of the Commission include authority to give effect to all the recommendations of the UNSCOP majority? These recommendations fell into two categories, those which were purely preparatory and those which affected government procedure and legislation. In the second category he referred in particular to the recommendations regarding immigration and land transfers. In the first category there were steps such as the recruitment and training of militia which would have to be taken well ahead of 1st May. Would the Commission have full power to ensure that the necessary preparatory measures were taken? To this question Granados replied that it was intended that the proposals now put forward varying the recommendations of the UNSCOP majority in regard to implementation would not affect the other UNSCOP recommendations which he hoped would be approved by the Sub-Committee. The Soviet delegate expressed agreement with this view; the UNSCOP recommendations in regard to immigration and land transfer would remain unchanged. As regards training and arming of the militia this was a point which still required elaboration by the Working Group. It would however only be possible for the General Assembly to make general provisions in this respect; situations would arise which could not be foreseen and in regard to which guidance would have to be given by the Security Council. The United States' representative (Johnson) thought that the UNSCOP recommendations should be followed though not perhaps in detail. It would be up to the Commission to implement them. Pearson here commented that he would not wish it to be understood that he had agreed that the UNSCOP recommendations should be adopted unchanged. Some of them might call for important changes in order to adapt them to the new proposals now put forward, for example the immigration rate

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designed for a two-year period might not be suitable for a shorter one; security conditions for which the Mandatory would be responsible would be affected by these recommendations. Johnson immediately explained that he did not wish his previous comment to be interpreted to mean that the UNSCOP recommendations should not be examined with a view to making them conform to the new proposals.

5. As regards the relationship between the Security Council and the Commission Johnson expressed the view of the United States' delegation that in order to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly it should not be necessary for the Commission to refer to the Security Council for formal approval of every act - the time at the Commission's disposal would be limited and it must be empowered to carry out its duties without delays.

6. The Chairman stated that as there appeared to be no objection to the report of the Working Group on implementation he would take it that it had been adopted by the Sub-Committee.

7. It was announced at the end of the meeting that the Ad Hoc Committee would meet tomorrow (Tuesday) for a short time in the morning, that thereafter the Working Group on implementation would meet to expand paragraphs 4 and 7 of their draft and that the full Sub-Committee would meet in the afternoon and at night.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem
as my telegram No. 170.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office,
for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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Reference: FO					
371 / 61887					

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1947

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10582

PALESTINE

12 NOV

Registry Number

E10582/957/31

FROM

Secretary

No.

Diamond

Dated

Received in Registry

12/1/47

Palestine Financial Problems.

Copy of letter from Mr. Howe-Watson, Roy to Sir Sydney Cain, FO enclosing memo prepared by Mr. Howe-Watson, who thinks that a paper dealing with the financial aspect of withdrawal from Palestine should be put up to Ministers concerned.

Last Paper.

10546

(Minutes.)

↓ B.N.V. 12

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

G.E.W. 12/11

(Index.)

M.J.G. 12/11

Next Paper.

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Reference:

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Minutes.

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Referring to a letter (OF85/10/6) to Sir Sidney Caine Colonial Office from Mr. Rowe-Dutton, Treasury, copy of which was sent to Mr. Michael Wright.

Mr. Boss Whitehall 3151 Exn 123

rang this evening to say that a meeting will be held in Mr. Rowe-Dutton's room at the Treasury Chambers on Monday at 4.45. They would like a representative of the Foreign Office to attend. It is on a fairly high level. Mr. Boss would like a reply tomorrow morning.

Shepherd

7.11.47.

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

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371 / 61887

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With Mr. E. Rowe-Dutton's Compliments.

10582
12 NOV

O.F.85/10/6

5th November, 1947

My dear Sydney,

I think we ought to put up a paper about Palestine to our respective Ministers fairly soon and I have prepared a draft of such a paper which I would like to clear with you before we go any further.

In spite of what Istorik says, I feel that the difficulties of treating Jewish-Palestine and Arab-Palestine differently are so great that we ought not to pay too much attention to Jewish wishes.

I am sending a copy of this note to Michael Wright at the Foreign Office.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) E. Rowe-Dutton

Sir Sydney Caine, K.C.M.G.,

Colonial Office.

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up sent

PALESTINE

Palestine balance,
£ 1000 50 CB
50 B...

76

On the assumption that we evacuate Palestine, and leave the administration in the hands of two new Governments, several financial problems arise. The technique of the solutions may vary with the actual circumstances of the evacuation, but the objectives should remain much the same.

2. The essential problems are:-

- (i) Do either or both of the new States remain in the sterling area?
- (ii) What about Palestine sterling balances?
- (iii) What about the Palestine Currency Board?
- (iv) What direct "financial settlement" is needed?

3. This note does not touch upon the last question, which I assume would have to cover the handing over of any assets of the U.K. Government in Palestine, the responsibility for Palestine pensions, liability for the Palestine Guaranteed Loan (of which some £3.2 million is outstanding) etc. The assumption is that in no circumstances will the British Taxpayer be called upon for any future support of either Government. There is however this connection with the other questions set out above, viz. that Palestine assets in the U.K. including those of the currency Board, might well be regarded as security for the claim of H.M.G. on the new Governments.

4. In dealing with the questions of Exchange Control, Sterling Balances and the Currency, it is assumed that we must give identical initial treatment to both Arabs and Jews. If, therefore, British interests make it imperative to take "hostile" action towards either new State, similar action must be taken towards the other.

5. It seems highly difficult to keep an Arab Palestine in the sterling area. They are not dollar earners, and though their dollar needs are small, there is no reason why we should meet them. But most important is that we could not rely at all on a local Exchange Control administered by Arabs to prevent a flight of capital out of the sterling area. Since capital would be free to get into Arab Palestine from any other part of the sterling area, this might prove an intolerable loophole. This might not prevent subsequent readmission, if and when

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the new Arab State finds its feet, and if it were prepared to accept British advisers in effective charge of the Exchange Control machine.

6. On the other hand, we have good reason to believe that Jewish Palestine would very greatly prefer to remain in the sterling area, and would be prepared to give all sorts of pledges about surrendering dollars, restricting imports, and managing Exchange Control generally. On the other hand, the new State is likely to be under considerable American influence; and may consequently be unwilling to work to sterling area standards of austerity. It might, sooner or later - currently or retroactively - even seek to insist on a dollar ration equivalent to Palestine's full dollar earnings. So long as financial support from the U.S.A. continues, Palestine will probably be a net dollar earner; but apart from this, would almost certainly be a net dollar spender. But this is not the only criterion for membership, and unless we are prepared to let Arab Palestine in too, we must put Jewish Palestine out, to begin with at any rate.

7. While therefore there would be advantages in allowing the Jewish State to remain within the sterling area, they are not so cogent as might be thought. The disadvantages of keeping Arab Palestine in the area are clear. If the two must, in the first instance, be treated alike, there is every reason to block all Palestine-owned balances, at least until a formal agreement about releases can be arrived at with duly functioning Governments. Otherwise we can have no control over the amounts by which the sterling balances might be drawn down to pay for purchases in the sterling area. The existence of very considerable balances outside the Currency Fund's reserves complicates the problem, and it may prove necessary to leave a considerable area of free funds to carry on normal business. There might be advantage in negotiating this with the present Administration before evacuation.

8. The Bank of England suggest this blocking action before expulsion from the sterling area, leaving the latter to be decided when we can see more clearly what sort of Exchange Control could be set up by the successor Governments. Unfortunately this course might involve us in

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differential treatment. This, as explained above, seems undesirable, and in any case it would be impossible while both areas continue de facto to use the same currency.

9. The Currency Board is less difficult to deal with. It is submitted that it should continue to function, as a resident in the sterling area, so that permission would be needed for it to pay out sterling to holders of notes presenting them for redemption. Permission could then normally be given for payment to blocked account only. There are other problems about the mechanics of redemption, but these do not call for high level decisions.

10. Eventually, the sterling assets of the Currency Board would have to be apportioned between the two new States. Pending this, they should be held "in trust" subject to regarding them as security to cover the claims of H.M.G. against the new States.

11. Further problems arise from the fact that Transjordan now uses Palestine currency, and has rather ineffective controls over imports and exchange. A very early separate issue of Transjordan currency seems desirable. It would be backed by sterling obtained by exchanging the new currency for Palestine notes held in Transjordan, and surrendering the latter for sterling held by the Palestine Currency Board. Thereafter the Transjordan controls would need to be tightened up.

12. Decisions are therefore sought to take preparatory steps, in consultation with the present Administration, for the blocking of Palestine sterling balances, the exclusion of Palestine from the sterling area, and the necessary steps regarding the Currency Board. The exact date on which these steps should come into effect will be a matter for subsequent decision.

(Sgd) E.Rowe-Dutton

4th November, 1947

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Following document(s) retained in the
Department of origin under Section 3 (4)
of the Public Records Act, 1958

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E 10590
112 NOV 79

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number E10590/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. No. 1

No.

New York

Dated

3320

Received in Registry

11 Nov

12 -

Illegal Immigration Discussion in ad hoc Committee
It is uncertain whether Illegal Immigration will
have been discussed in ad hoc Committee by 19 Nov
Meanwhile if detailed statement is made in reply
to P.Q. it would be quoted in any subsequent
statement here, given suggestions for dealing
with matter.

Last Paper.

10585

References.

E 10442/46/9

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8 Mathison, 60.

1 M.1.3a.

M.O.H.

Admby.

A.M.

Nov. 13

(or E10595/951/31)

(Action completed.)

J.E.W. 14/11

(Index.)

1/9/48

Next Paper.

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References:

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c.o. are preparing a draft ^(Minutes.) which they hope
to have ready for us on Monday.

Jable
(SECRET)

13/11

J.B.M. 13

9 a.p.p. 80 tel to U.K. 10/11 22/11

M. Cable
12/12

J.B. Dec. 3

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1. *S. H. M.*

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE *E 80*

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3320

D. 7.40 p.m. 11th November, 1947.

11th November, 1947.

R. 1.25 a.m. 12th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington Saving

10590

12 NOV

IMPORTANT

CONFIDENTIAL

Following for Trafford-Smith, Colonial Office from Martin.

Your telegram No. 3185. *3815*

It is still uncertain whether we shall have discussed illegal immigration in ad hoc committee by 19th November. You will be informed immediately if there any any developments in this connexion. Meanwhile if detailed statement is made in reply to Parliamentary questions it could be quoted in any subsequent statement here.

2. I suggest that no useful purpose would be served by high lighting discomforts and danger of voyage to Palestine, the sufferings of women and children and points of that kind which would merely irritate Zionists and their friends and arouse latent sympathy for the immigrants. Our shafts should be directed rather against the Governments which (incidentally in disregard of the United Nations Assembly resolution of 31st May) have connived at the activities of their nationals in aiding the illicit traffic. We need not put all the blame on the United States and effective use, particularly from the point of view of opinion here, could be made of facts regarding the recent organised immigration through Russian controlled areas.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 173.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem and for Mr. Trafford-Smith.]

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Reference:

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

E 81

FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES
76021/47/P.Q.10.

INDEXED

10590/957/31

Cypher (O.T.P.)

TO U.K. DELEGATION, NEW YORK

Sent 22nd November, 1947. 22.45 hrs.

IMPORTANT
SECRET

Addressed UKDEL, New York.
Repeated High Commissioner, Palestine No.2936.
" Washington.

Following for Martin from Trafford Smith.

Your telegram No.3320.

Illegal Immigration - Parliamentary Question.

Ministers decided that moment was not opportune to make detailed statement about organisation and financing of illegal immigration. We shall, of course, continue to use material for guidance to Press. Copy of statement which was agreed by Working Party follows by bag.

(Copy sent to Foreign Office for transmission to New York and Washington)

Copies sent to:-
Foreign Office - Mr. Cable.

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Reference:

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E 10591

1947

PALESTINE

12 NOV

82

Registry Number E10591/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

U.K. 1201
New York.

3323

11.11.47

12 -

Political Sub Committee Sat.
during meeting of 11 Nov Chairman asked whether
UK Representatives had any observations to make on
the problem of implementation for a budget on said
to be no statement at present, orders awaiting
reply from London. He expressed hope that the
proposals for implementation which were being worked
out would not require much of the money for
incidental with attitude defined by Dept for Colonies.

Last Paper.

10590

References.

(Minutes.)

J.A.-17/XI
UN. (Pol.) Dept.

D.S. Series
Nov. 12
(BEITH)

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8 Mathison. BU.
1 M.1.39.
M.O.4
Attny
(one E10516/951/31)
Nov 12

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

4/6/47

[Signature]

Next Paper.

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Reference: FO 371/61887

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En Clair

12 NOV
WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3325.

D. 8.44 p.m. 11th November, 1947.

11th November, 1947.

R. 2.35 a.m. 12th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem and Washington (Saving).

IMMEDIATE.

GIANT.

Palestine Committee.

During the meeting of Sub-committee one on the afternoon of the 11th November the Chairman asked whether the representative of the United Kingdom had any observations to make on the problem of implementation.

2. Cadogan said that at present he had no statement to make. The delegation were consulting their Government on a number of questions and had not yet received a reply from London. He had no doubt that the reply would be sent as early as possible. Meanwhile he took the opportunity to express the hope that the proposals for implementation which were being worked out would not require His Majesty's Government to take action inconsistent with the attitude defined in the two statements made to the main Committee by the Colonial Secretary.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 174.

[Copy sent Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

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PALESTINE

Registry Number

E10595/95-1/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. Del

No.

New York

Dated

3315

Received in Registry

11 Nov

12 ~

Palatine Sub Committee Reports.
Ad hoc committee met Monday to hear progress report from Chairman of Sub. Committee. Sub Committee was asked for a few more days to complete report. Chairman of Sub. Committee stated that his report was ready for format adaptation but that its submission to Ad hoc committee would be simultaneous with that of Sub Committee and that when reports were ready Ad hoc committee would act daily.

Last Paper.

10591

(Minutes.)

References.

W.N. (Pol.) Dept.

*J. S. Beins
NW. 12
(BEITH)*

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

*8 Matheson. B.O.
M. 1. 3a.
M04
Admly
A.M.
✓ Nov 13*

(Action completed.)

9/19/48

(Index.)

11/9/48

Next Paper.

E 10609

Wt. 24772/717 17395 10/38 F.O.P.

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Reference:

FO

371

61887

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10595

85

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3315

D. 2.20 p.m. 11th November 1947.

11th November 1947.

R. 7.43 p.m. 11th November 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington (Saving)

GIANT

Palestine.

The ad hoc Committee met this morning merely to hear progress reports from the Chairmen of the two Sub-Committees. The Chairman of Sub-Committee One asked for a few more days to complete his report. On being pressed by Evatt to finish by tomorrow night he said that he would try and do so but could not promise. The Chairman of Sub-Committee stated that his report was ready for formal adoption but that its submission to the ad hoc Committee would be simultaneous with that of Sub-Committee One. Evatt replied that it was duty of the Sub-Committee to make the report available for study by the ad hoc Committee as soon as it was ready. He added that when the reports of both Sub-Committees had been received the ad hoc Committee would meet every day three times a day until it was in a position to report to the Assembly.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 172.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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Reference:

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61887

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NOV 1947

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E 10609

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13 NOV

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E10609/957/31

FROM

Lieut. A Kirkbride

No.

Amman

Dated

5/852/41

Received in Registry

W. Burrows

1.11.47

13

Palatine Discussion, King Abdullah and Mr. Wallace.
Mr. Wallace had lengthy discussion with King Abdullah on Palestine. He told the King that the world was entering an age of technology of which the Jews were masters and it was useless for the Arabs to stand aloof. They had entered immunities against and had done nothing but good for the country here since why could the Arabs not benefit also. King Abdullah pointed out that the Jews wished to enter Palestine as masters and not refugees.

Last Paper.

10595

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

7, Mr. Green Jones.
Nov. 25

(Action completed.)

PO
3/12

(Index.)

[Handwritten signature]
1/11/48

Next Paper.

10631

(Minutes.)

Mr. Wallace is at least frank

N.A. Dept. 23/11
FOR 27/11

[Signature]
(T. E. Gable)
13/11

J. S. Benin
Nov. 13

L. H. Pyman
14/11

[Signature]
16.11

M. L. Wright

12.11

Sir O. Sargent.

O. Sargent
Nov 16

Copy S. G. for the Colonies
(See S. G.'s minutes within)

32003 F.O.P

18/11

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Reference:

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3. ADDRESS: PRODROME AMMAN

CONFIDENTIAL

(S/852/46).

10009

enter
BRITISH LEGATION
AMMAN

87 E
1st November, 1947.

13 NOV

Dear Burrows,

Mr. Wallace visited Transjordan on the 29th of October and lunched with King Abdullah. Before the meal they had a lengthy discussion about Palestine.

2. Wallace took the line that the world was entering an age of technology of which the Jews were masters. It was useless for the Arabs to attempt to stand aloof, sooner or later they would be reached by the tide of industrial progress and it would be in their interest to come to terms with the Jews as soon as was possible. The Jews had been accepted as refugees in America and had done nothing but good to their country of adoption. Why could they Arabs not benefit from their art and knowledge also ?

3. King Abdullah replied that when the Jews went to America, they had the intention of becoming American citizens but they came to Palestine with the intention of becoming its rulers. If they would come to the Arab countries in the same frame of mind as they had gone to America, the Arab League would be willing to come to terms with them but no Arab could stand by and watch, unmoved, the creation of a Jewish state in part of his homeland.

The King went on to question the wisdom of the Government of the United States of America to support the Jewish claims quite so openly.

Mr. Wallace replied that the Jewish influence in America was too strong for any administration to ignore.

4. In parting Mr. Wallace expressed his admiration of the moderation of the King, all other Arab leaders had talked of battle and bloodshed; he expressed the hope that the King might be able to modified his stand over the creation of a Jewish state.

The King expressed his pleasure at having met Mr. Wallace and the hopes that the latter might prevail on his Jewish friends to drop the idea of having a Jewish state and to approach the Arab countries as they had approached America.

5. I am sending a copy of this letter to the High Commissioner at Jerusalem.

Yours sincerely
Amir

B.A.B. Burrows, Esq.,
The Eastern Department,
The Foreign Office,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

has sent to Jones
had copy
MS Creed Jones
had copy E.B.
A. KIRK BRIDG

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

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E 10631

1947

113 NOV

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PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 10631/951/31

TELEGRAM FROM

Le B. Bodogan
New York

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

3328
12, Nov
13 -

Sub Committee One

Refer New York tel 3323 (E 10591/951/31) following an
argument under ref. Pearson said that this underlines
difficulties of working group on implementation
They were proceeding upon certain assumptions and were
not sure whether these were consistent with H.M.G.
attitude. He requested change that a representative of
U.K. be present at working group meeting when
required. Le B. Bodogan, agreed.

Last Paper.

10609

References.

(Minutes.)

✓ (P.A. 17) X
UP (Pol.) Dept.

D. S. Denis
Nov. 13

JBB

12.11

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8 Weatherman. 80.

M. I. 3a.

M04

Adams

G.M.

Nov. 13

(Action completed.)

J.E.M. 20/11

(Index.)

[Handwritten signature]

Next Paper.

E 10833

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Reference:

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371

61887

1947

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E 10633

13 NOV

89

PALESTINE

Registry Number E10633/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.K. 1051

No.

New York

Dated

Received in Registry

3336

12 Nov

13

Political Sub Committee One.

In discussions on boundaries, hereby not forward arguments against the proposals of the Working Group, in so far as they separated Arab villages from their land and transferred upon good agricultural soil to the Arab State. To meet former objection which said that the Jewish delegation was prepared to give an undertaking that land in the Jewish State belonging to villages which Arab State would not be given at a higher rate than it had been in the Arab State. Further points were discussed

Last Paper.

10631.

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

S. Macheson 80

14.1.31

11.10.4

Admly

W.M.

Nov 14

(Action completed.)

J.E.M. 18/11

(Index)

[Handwritten initials]

Next Paper.

E 10646

(Minutes.)

2 (c) shows that the Soviet delegate is supporting the Jewish case on matters of detail i.e. modifications of the Majority Report in favour of the Jews, as well as on the main principle

Northem Dept.

J.S. Baird

Nov. 13

This was discussed at this morning's Middle East propaganda meeting and arrangements were made for this Soviet behaviour to be exploited in our propaganda to the Arab world.

L.P.L. Pyman

14/11

N. [Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten initials]

14.11

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EN CLAIR

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

90

(From United Kingdom Delegation)

No: 3356

D.9.25 p.m. 12th November 1947

12th November 1947

R.8.10 a.m. 15th November 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington Saving

10033
13 NOV

GIANT

Palestine Sub-Committee One.

In the discussions on boundaries on Tuesday Lisieky put forward arguments against the proposals of the Working Group in so far as they separated Arab villages from their land and encroached upon road communications essential to the Arab State. To meet the former objection Shertok said that "The Jewish Delegation" was prepared to give an undertaking that land in the Jewish State belonging to villages in the Arab State would not be taxed at a higher rate than if it had been in the Arab State. The changes proposed by the Jewish Agency he said involved the division of only 27 villages but eliminated the cutting by the UNSCOP line of 15 other villages.

2. Other points of particular interest in the discussions were:

(a) Lydda airport. The United States delegate at first stated that the arguments put forward for its exclusion from the Arab State were insufficient to warrant the support of his delegation which wished to concur in a proposal made by Canada that the boundary should be so adjusted as to permit access to the airport from the Jewish State. When however the Soviet delegate had given strong support for the Jewish claim the United States delegate reversed his previous stand and expressed himself in favour of including the airport in the Jewish State, subject to special mention in the declaration of economic union which would guarantee to the Arabs access and use.

(b) Sarafand. The Jewish claim put forward on the grounds that the camp was required by the Jews both for military purposes and for the clearance of new immigrants, was firmly supported by the Soviet delegate.

(c) Shertok stated that the population figures used by the Jewish Agency in presenting their case were the official estimates of the Government of Palestine in respect of the Arab population and the Jewish Agency's own estimates in respect of the Jewish population. These were the only reliable estimates.

(d) In reply to a question from Canada the representative of the Jewish Agency said that the Palestine Potash Company was ready to agree to an equal division of royalties between the Jewish and Arab states irrespective of decisions on boundaries affecting the concession areas. Shertok hoped that the sub-committee would agree to the request of the company to include in the Jewish State the whole of the western shore of the Dead Sea and the northern works.

(e) NOV 15 1947

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Reference: **FO**
371 / 61887

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(S)

(e) After a majority of members had expressed themselves against the Jewish Agency's proposal to include the village lands of Umm El Fahn and Arara in the Jewish State, the Chairman had summed up against this unimportant claim and Shertok had indicated in a final speech that he was reluctantly prepared to abandon it. The Soviet delegate who, except in regard to Sarafand and Lydda airport, had taken no other part in the five hour discussions, said that his delegation was in favour of the Jewish claim since they considered the area necessary to the Jewish State on economic grounds.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No:177.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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Reference:

FO

371

61887

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92
10657
14 NOV

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number } E10657/951/31
 TELEGRAM FROM } U.K. Net
 No. } New York
 Dated } 3349
 Received in Registry } 13 Nov
 14 -

Statement by Sir A. Cadogan
 Refers New York tel 3343 (E10646/951/31)
 Statement was made by Sir A. Cadogan
 in form of a draft contained in telegram
 under ref.

Last Paper.
10646

(Minutes.)

References.

See E10646

Sir A. Cadogan made his statement, as drafted, in the Sub-Committee on Mr Martin is normally the Brit. representative in the Sub-Committee and Sir A. Cadogan's presence will have emphasised the importance of the statement.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)
 S. Watkinson. 60.
 M. 1.30.
 M.O.H.
 A draft
 a.m.
 Nov 15
 (with E10658)

Mr. Beith
 Nov. 14
 (BEITH)

(Action completed.) J.L. 24/11	(Index) [Signature]
-----------------------------------	------------------------

Next Paper.
10658

1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

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E 93

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

10357

No. 3349
13th November, 1947.

D. 4. 17 p.m. ~~13th~~ 14th November, 1947.
R. 9. 32 p.m. 13th November, 1947.

Repeated to Washington
Jerusalem

MOST IMMEDIATE
GIANT

My telegram No. 3343: Palestine.

Statement was made by Sir A Cadogan this afternoon in the form of a draft contained in telegram under reference.

Foreign Office please pass most immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 179.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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Reference:

FO

371

61887

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1947

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E 10658

14 NOV

94

PALESTINE

Registry Number E10658/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

Dated

Received in Registry

U.K. Tel
New York.
335-4
13, Nov
14

Statement by Sir A. Cadogan
Refer New York tel 3943 (E10646/957/31)
Answers list of questions asked by Guatemalan
following statement by Sir A. Cadogan.

Last Paper.

10657

(Minutes.)

See also E 10659.

References.

Sir A. Cadogan's statement in the Palestine sub-committee is generally satisfactory, but I am not quite so happy about the tendency of his replies to the Guatemalan's questions in this telegram.

I attach a draft telegram which, if approved by Sir O. Sargent, would be sent to the Colonial Office and Ministry of Defence for concurrence.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

W. Watkinson, Esq.
M.I. 30.
M.I. 4
A.M.
Nov. 15.
(Amendment) as above
Nov. 15.

Tel, New York. 3927.
15. Nov.

(Action completed.)

L. C. M. 14/11

(Index)

17/9/47

Next Paper.

10659

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Reference: FO 371 / 61887

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AMENDMENT SLIP.

E10658/951/31

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

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New York telegram No. 3354 of 13th November
to Foreign Office.

Please renumber as New York telegram
No. 3357.

COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT.

14th November, 1947.



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Reference:

FO

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61887

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En clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3554
November 13th, 1947.

D. 9.55 p.m. November 13th, 1947.
R. 3.45 a.m. November 13th, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem and Washington.

IMMEDIATE
GIANT

Palestine.

After Cadogan had made the statement contained in my telegram No. 3345 the following questionnaire was read by Granados (Guatemala).

2. [Begins]

The United Kingdom has stated very clearly its intention to surrender the mandate and to evacuate Palestine and its desire that an alternative authority would be provided for the implementation of the United Nations decision.

I wish to ask a general question and few particular questions related to the general one

(a) Will the United Kingdom as a good member of the United Nations accept the recommendations of the General Assembly in regard to Palestine if these recommendations do not require it to play an active role, that is to say, to enforce these recommendations?

From that question can be deduced the following:

1. Will the United Kingdom accept the date of termination of the mandate?

2. Will the mandatory Power agree not to obstruct the general task of the General Assembly Commission appointed to implement partition?

3. Will the mandatory Power agree not to obstruct the establishment of the provisional councils of Government for the Jewish and Arab States?

4. Will the mandatory Power agree not to obstruct the recruitment and organisation of the militias that will police the States when they become independent?

5. Will the mandatory Power agree not to obstruct the work of the Committee put in charge of the demarcation of the boundaries?

6. Will the mandatory Power when requested surrender the different branches of the Administration in a gradual and progressive way to the Commission the provisional Councils of Government and the Economic Board?

7. Will the mandatory Power instruct the Administration of Palestine to facilitate the tasks of the

/Commission

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Reference:

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13 NOV 1947
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13 NOV 1947
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/Commission

94

Commission giving to it any kind of data deemed necessary by the said Commission?

8. Will the mandatory Power agree not to obstruct the General Assembly recommendations in regard to immigration and land regulations for the territory of the future Jewish State? [Ends]

5. Cadogan answered the general question by saying that if the Assembly recommended a solution by a two thirds majority His Majesty's Government would take no action contrary to it. On the first of the specific questions he pointed out that he did not yet know what date would be proposed for the termination of the mandate and repeated the relevant passage of his opening statement. To questions 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8 he gave a generally affirmative answer subject to the overriding condition that the British authorities in the areas they continued to occupy must retain sufficient control to ensure the safety and orderly withdrawal of their troops. Answering the sixth question he explained that the branches of the Administration might have ceased to exist before the new authorities were in a position to take them over. We should in no way obstruct the assumption of Governmental functions by these authorities in territory evacuated by the British troops. Dealing with the seventh question he said he would encourage the Committee to believe that the British authorities would provide this assistance.

4. Granados thanked Cadogan for clearing his mind on these points and expressed the hope that agreement might be reached between the United Nations and His Majesty's Government on a mutually satisfactory date for the termination of the mandate.

5. Pearson (Canada) said that the working group would now have to take another look at their draft proposals. He thought, however, that they could continue to work and was not unhopeful of submitting a report to the sub-committee without too much delay.

6. Herschel Johnson (United States) then referred to Cadogan's assurance that the United Kingdom would not impede the assumption of Governmental functions by new authorities. Could the provisional Councils hope that the British authorities would give adequate warning of their intention to leave specific areas? Would it be possible for the British military authorities to reach some sort of agreement with the new non-British civil authorities covering administration within the zones of occupation.

7. Cadogan replied that no obstruction would be put in the way of the new authorities taking over their functions as and when areas were evacuated by the military. He would ask his Government for their comments on the probable situation in areas where there would be a military but not a civil administration.

8. Granados asked whether any areas would already have been evacuated when the Commission arrived. Asked by Cadogan when the Commission would arrive he said he hoped it would reach Palestine early in December. He was anxious to know what was meant by military occupation. Would any town with a military commander be considered to be under military occupation even if few or no troops were stationed there? Cadogan said he was not in a position to define military occupation. Nor had he any information on the stages of withdrawal and their timing.

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Reference: **EO**
371 / 61887

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-5-

9. The Committee adjourned to permit the working group to resume their discussions.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 584.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

SSSS

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Reference:

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371

61887

Registry
No.

OUT FILE SECRET

99

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Open.

F. O.,

November 15th 1947.

Despatched *[Signature]* M.

B. A. B. B.

Draft
UK Del
New York.

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

CONFIDENTIAL

Telegram.

No. 3927

(Date) Nov. 15

Repeat to:—

Washington 11814

Jerusalem

while I appreciate the difficulties of the sub-committee in the preparation of a scheme when no plan of withdrawal is available.

~~EXXOXOX~~

Code
Cypher.

Distribution:—

World Organisation.

RECEIVED IN C.B.

17 NOV 1947

SENT TO DEPT.

Copies to:

Palestine.

I approve your statement of November 13th.

2. With regard to the questions recorded

in your telegram No. 3354, I am inclined to

resent being cross-examined as to our

detailed intentions in this manner before it

is known whether the principle of partition,

which is the whole basis for the working

groups activities, will be accepted.

Are you yet able to is your present estimate of probable voting

on this on this principle in the Assembly?

3. The object of the Zionist clique who

appear to be running sub-committee is no

doubt to arrange that any commission sent to

Palestine would concentrate on setting up a

Jewish State *in the most favourable* with most extensive possible

possible circumstances, boundaries and best possible defence arrangements

leaving Arab areas to look after themselves.

Jewish State would thus be established with

the full authority of U.N. and any attempt

to modify its extent or constitution could

be represented as directed against the

United Nations. If this assumption is *Correct,* agreed,

we must scrutinise very carefully the questions

put by the Guatemalan representative. There

is a danger that, if we say we will take no

action/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Wt. 43897-140 100m 3147 G.S.S. Cp 620 (13556)

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Reference: FO 371 61887

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action contrary to an Assembly recommendation, we shall find ourselves pledged, e.g. to hand over ⁱⁿ the course of our withdrawal an ^{Area} area which ^{is} ~~would~~ ^{is} ~~consider~~ ^{is} Arab ^{to} a Jewish authority ~~because it happened to be inside the Jewish State as defined by the Assembly.~~ The best way to keep out of this difficulty seems to be to explain clearly that, while we cannot imagine any circumstances in which we should ~~obstruct~~ ^{obstruct} any effective recommendation made by the Assembly, the consideration to which we shall attach most weight in arranging the details of our withdrawal will be our own administrative and military convenience.

4. Questions ^{No 6 & paras} ~~Nos~~ 6 and 7 cannot be answered until we have more detailed plans for withdrawal which are now being prepared.

5. With reference to question No. 8, we could not admit unlimited immigration while we remain administratively responsible for the whole of Palestine.

BRK 0574

applies to same offer 3355 and 3367 to your file No 3355

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

OUT FILE

SECRET

101

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Confidential

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3927

15th November, 1947.

D. 2.55 p.m. 15th November, 1947.

Repeated to Washington No. 11814
Jerusalem

IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
GIANT

Palestine

I approve your statement of November 13th.

2. With regard to the questions recorded in your telegram No. 3354, while I appreciate the difficulties of the sub-committee in the preparation of a scheme when no plan of withdrawal is available, I am inclined to resent being cross-examined as to our detailed intentions in this manner before it is known whether the principle of partition, which is the whole basis for the working group's activities, will be accepted. Are you yet able to estimate the probable voting on this principle in the Assembly?

3. The object of the Zionist clique who appear to be running sub-committee 1 is no doubt to arrange that any commission sent to Palestine would concentrate on setting up a Jewish State in the most favourable possible circumstances, leaving Arab areas to look after themselves. Jewish State would thus be established with the full authority of United Nations and any attempt to modify its extent or constitution could be represented as directed against the United Nations. If this assumption is correct, we must scrutinise very carefully the questions put by the Guatemalan representative. There is a danger that, if we say we will take no action contrary to an Assembly recommendation, we shall find ourselves pledged, e.g. to hand over to a Jewish authority in the course of our withdrawal an Arab area which was resisting inclusion in the Jewish State. The best way to keep out of this difficulty seems to be to explain clearly that, while we cannot imagine any circumstances in which we should obstruct any effective recommendation made by the Assembly, the consideration to which we shall attach most weight in arranging the details of our withdrawal will be our own administrative and military convenience.

4. Question No. 6 and paragraphs 6 and 7 cannot be answered until we have more detailed plans for withdrawal which are now being prepared. The same applies to your telegrams Nos 3355 and 3367.

5. With reference to question No. 8, we could not admit unlimited immigration while we remain administratively responsible for the whole of Palestine.

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E 10659

1947

PALESTINE

14 NOV

102

Registry Number

E10659/95-1/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

U.K. reel
New York.

Dated

Received in Registry

3355
13 Nov
14

Palatine Lib Committee Reel

Refer New York tel 3554 (E10658/95-1/21)
Shirrell Johnson in conversation before meeting
began had asked whether the retention of
civil administration in the areas remaining under
British military occupation would not create
an awkward situation
U.K. reel would welcome guidance on this
point.

Last Paper.

1065-8

(Minutes.)

See E 10658

References.

JB MW.17

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

8, Walsman, 80
M.I. 39
MOK
Admty
Q.M.
Nov 14
(with E 10660)
In P.P.
8) as above
Nov 17

(Action completed.)

G.L. 17/11

(In x.)

[Signature]

Next Paper.

10660

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References:

FO

371

61887

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E 103

AMENDMENT SLIP.

E10659/951/31.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

New York telegram No. 5355 of 13th
November to Foreign Office.

Reference should read "My telegram
No. 5357 paragraph 7".

COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT.

14th November 1947.

[Handwritten signature]
15/11



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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

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104

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CYPHER/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No:5555

D.9.46 p.m. 13th November 1947

13th November 1947

R.5.30 a.m. 14th November 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington

10659
14 NOV

IMMEDIATE

GIANT

Palestine.

ED 118

My telegram No:5554 paragraph 7.

Herschel Johnson in conversation before the meeting began had asked whether the cessation of civil administration in the areas remaining under British military occupation would not create an awkward situation.

2. We do not know whether it is considered possible or desirable to relinquish the mandate piecemeal, so that we should retain our full mandatory authority in such parts of Palestine as we continued to occupy, up to the departure of our last contingents. We should welcome guidance on this point.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No:181.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

444.



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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

E

105

1947

PALESTINE

E 10560
14 NOV

Registry Number E10560/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No. U.K. Red New York

Dated 3356

Received in Registry 13 Nov 14

U.N. Commission on Palestine.
Refer resolution 181. The informant that
Venezuelan delegate who appears sometimes to be
used as a mouthpiece for pro-Jewish interests
to propose the following membership for the
U.N. Commission on Palestine: Guatemala, Uruguay
or Scandinavian Country, Poland or Czechoslovakia
and a British Dominion.

Last Paper.

10659

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

S Matheson 6/1

M. 1.3a.

10/4

Adolph

A. N.

(on E10659) Nov 14

Ad. New York.

3892. 13 Nov.

S Matheson 6/0

Nov 15.

(Action completed.)

J. E. M. 26/11

(Index.)

1/14/48

Next Paper.

E 10667

(Minutes.)

The reference cannot be traced by
the Div. but I think it was merely
an enquiry on this point by
the High Commissioner. A copy
has been asked for.

Guatemala and Uruguay
are both pro-Jewish and in
favour of the Majority plan
(and probably of the suggested
amendments in favour of the
Jews). Poland or Czechoslovakia
will probably follow the Russian
line in favour of a Jewish
State. The Scandinavians
are also on the whole pro-
Jewish.

P.T.O.

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Reference:

FO

371

61887

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J.N. 1970
U.N. (Pol.) Dept.
S. A. Dept. ✓ JUL 21"
Northen Dept. 7024(ul4)
C.L. Dept.

J.S. BENT
Nov. 14
(BEITH)

JB

14.11

In f.p. Pictone Ed 2138 12/11

JB NOV. 17

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References:

FO 371 / 61887

107
170060
14 NOV

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No.3356
13th November,1947.

D. 9.43 p.m. 13th November,1947.
R. 3.25 a.m. 14th November,1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem,
Washington Saving.

IMMEDIATE
GIANT
SECRET

Palestine.

Jerusalem telegram No.2138 to Foreign Office paragraph 3.

We are informed that the Venezuelan delegate who appears sometimes to be used as a mouthpiece for greater powers, intends to propose the following membership for the United Nations Commission in Palestine: Guatemala, Uruguay a Scandinavian country, Poland or Czechoslovakia and a British Dominion.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No.182.

[Copy sent to Telegram Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

QQQ



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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

Colonial Office ^{PW}

13 November '47

Tele sent
JTB Nov. 13

10660 951 31

108

My dear Beith,

I enclose a copy of
Palestine Telegram No 2138 of the
12th November. The telegram to
which it refers are Colonial
Office reports to Jerusalem of
New York Telegrams to Foreign
Office No 3293 (the U.S. -
Soviet proposals) and No 3308
(New York comment on the
proposals). It would help
New York if you could send

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Reference:

FO

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61887

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Colonial Office *PW*

13 November '47

tele sent
13 Nov. '47

108

10660 951 31
15 NOV 1947

My dear Beith,

I enclose a copy of
Palestine telegram No 2138 of the
12th November. The telegrams to
which it refers are Colonial
Office reports to Jerusalem of
New York telegrams to Foreign
Office No 3293 (the U.S. -
Soviet proposals) and No 3308
(New York comment on the
proposals). It would help
New York if you could send

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Reference:

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109

then a short telegram explaining that this telegram (Jerusalem to UKDFZ 1546) refer to 3297 and 3308 from New York to F.O.

Jerusalem have been asked to refer to the original number in all telegrams to be passed to New York.

RECEIVED
14 NOV 1947

Your wds,
CWA Mathison

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Reference:

FO


371

61887

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INWARD TELEGRAM

16
PW 110



Sydney (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D.12th November, 1947.
R.12th " " 14.55 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 2138 Top Secret and Personal.

Addressed to the S. of S.
Repeated to U.K.D.E.L. No.1546 (S. of S. please pass).

Your telegrams Nos. 2783 and 2785.

In my view we should not resist the appointment of United Nations Commission to whom we could transfer responsibility for administration, since, in the interests of the people of Palestine, we are anxious to avoid the chaos and worse that would arise in a vacuum. Our acceptance of the Commission could be based on this ground alone; and need not (corrupt group) our approval or otherwise of the plan for Partition.

2. I presume that, if such a Commission were appointed, they would arrive some months before the withdrawal of Palestine Government. I note that during this period this Government would be responsible for the maintenance of law and order. It would be necessary to prevent the Commission taking any action that would lead to a breach of the peace during this time, and such action would include any direct measures taken to implement Partition. Commission would thus be confined during this period to:-

(a)/

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

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111

(a) Planning for transfer of power, i.e. all Government services, assets and liabilities to the Commission at the date of withdrawal.

(b) Formation of Security Force.

3. I am under no illusion as to the uneasiness of the situation during the period of overlap, and the fullest importance of ensuring that personnel of the Commission are not already sold to either the Arabs or the Jews. I feel sure that amongst the supporters of Partition there must be still some who are regarded as non-partisan. It would be most dangerous to the peaceful implementation of any plan if men like Granados and Fabrigat (whom the Arabs know conducted themselves disgracefully when they were here) were sent as members. Surely this is the least we should be entitled to anticipate.

4. It is worth noting that among the Arabs here there is no sign at all of any possibility of co-operation with U.N.O. body, and it would be interesting to know whether there are any such signs in Lake Success.

5. I assume that our object is still to withdraw, if possible without getting into conflict with either Arabs or Jews. I must confess, however, that if U.N.O. gets a two thirds majority for Partition, it seems unlikely that we will be able avoid a clash in any circumstances. Should we accept the present proposals, we cannot avoid some Arab disorder, but I am informed that if a two thirds majority for Partition is not forthcoming, more particularly through action on our part such as abstention in voting or opposition to the plan, we must expect increased Jewish terrorism, especially if there is no increase in the immigration quota, when some Hagana action may be expected as well.

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for retransmission to U.K.D.E.L. New York).

Distributed to:-

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Reference:

FO

371

61887

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112

INWARD TELEGRAM

Distributed to:-

R.245
Secretary of State
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. Rees-Williams
Sir S. Caine
Sir C. Jeffries
Mr. Holding
Foreign Office

Mr. Martin
Mr. Trafford Smith
Mr. Gutch
Mr. Mathieson
Mr. Higham
Mr. Galsworthy
Mr. Holmer
Mr. Gibson
Mr. J.G.S. Beith.

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61887

Registry
No.

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Open.

Draft. *Tel.*

UK Del.

N. York

TEK No. 3892

DATE Nov. 13

en clair

dept. no. 1

Copy to

(Mr. Mathieson)

OUT FILE

113

Date

Despatched

13/11
9.18 PM

Jerusalem tel. no. AM

2138 to Colonial Office

(1546 to you) refers

to your tels. Nos. 3293

and 3308.

JB Nov. 13

RECEIVED IN C.B.

14 NOV 1947

SENT TO DEPT.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

1	2	3	4	5	6
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Reference:

FO

371

61887

OUT FILE

114

En Clair

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 5892

13th November, 1947

D. 9.18 p.m. 13th November, 1947

Jerusalem telegram No. 2138 to Colonial Office
1546 to you) refers to your telegrams Nos. 5295 and 5308.

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Reference:

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212

E

115

E 10667

14 NOV

1947

PALESTINE

Registry Number } E10667/951/31
 FROM }
 No. } P.R.O.
 Dated } board.
 Received in Registry } 14 Nov

Palatine, Opinion of Field Marshal Smuts.
 Copy of letter from H/C South Africa Ref.
 25.26/44/28 of 12.11.00. Referring to P.R.O. file
 862 (E 9462/951/31)

Transmit personal opinion of Field Marshal Smuts on the Palatine question.

(Minutes.)

Last Paper.

10660

References.

See draft by C. Dept.

*D.S. Peiris
Nov. 14*

D'fr sent to CRO

Easton Dept

M.G. L'Joy 15/11.

JB Nov. 17

9.11.11. 7.0 minute M.G.L. Joy 14/11.

JB Nov. 17

*9.11.11. P.R.O. letter P. Noel-Baker to H/C South Africa.
F 2781/43 12/11*

JB Nov. 20

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action completed.)

*PP
7/6/19/11*

(Index)

[Handwritten signature]

Next Paper.

E 10682

1 2 3 4 5 6

References: **FO** 371 / 61887

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Minutes.

116

Mr. Burrows, Eastern Department

I attach a draft reply to Mr. Heaton Nicholls which I have prepared at the request of the Commonwealth Relations Office.

In view of the fact that Field Marshal Smuts will be arriving in England over the weekend, they would be grateful if the letter could be cleared in time for it to reach South Africa House before Monday morning.

M.G.L.

M.G.L. Joy

14th November, 1947

*I have made some amendments.
We ought I suppose
to get C.O. concurrence. B.A.B. Burrows*

14.11

B.A.B. Burrows

Nothing to be Written in this Margin.

*Mathison
Ext. 81
C.O.*

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Reference:

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61887

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With the Conciliators of the Private
Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations

LETTER

enter
TOP SECRET 117
R.D.

13 NOV 1947

From: High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa in London.

To: Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

D. 12th Nov., 1947. (Ref: P.S. 26/44/28)
Red. C.R.O. 12th Nov., 1947.

TOP SECRET

My dear Secretary of State,

Field Marshal Smuts has been giving earnest thought to the problem of Palestine and with particular reference to your telegram D. No.862 of 7th November, 1947, has asked me to say that although Palestine is primarily and directly a matter of concern for the United Kingdom he believes he might be allowed, in view of his long personal interest in this matter, to express the following personal opinion.

The Palestine question must be solved and is on the point of solution but the solution may well depend on the goodwill and co-operation of the United Kingdom at this final stage. Throughout the last thirty years the United Kingdom has taken the lead in befriending the Jews and promoting the policy of the National Home. This policy of friendship should be continued to the end and the Jews should owe the fruition of their aspirations for a National Home mainly to British policy. It will remove the memory of the recent frictions and become the basis for Jewish friendship in the future - a friendship which may prove a precious asset for the United Kingdom in its Middle East policy in future.

The large measure of agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in this matter is a wonderful development and a challenge to the United Kingdom not to jeopardise a solution and give cause to the Jews to look upon those powers as their real friends. Those powers may be correct in not attaching more weight to the ferocious threats of the Arab States in case of partition. Even at the risk of some sacrifice and serious inconvenience the United Kingdom Government might consider sympathetically the policy of ranging itself with the United States and the U.S.S.R. in pushing partition now to a successful conclusion. It will mean a consistent British policy throughout the years until success was achieved. And it may mean much for future British policy in an area which is/

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Reference:

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RECEIVED IN O.B.
13 NOV 1947
SENT TO DEPT.

- 2 -

is rapidly becoming a main battleground of International Diplomacy. It would be a grave mistake to minimize the importance of the Jewish factor. Also this might prove the crucial occasion for finally securing Jewish friendship and support for British interests in that important area.

My Prime Minister recognises the complexities of the question but fears that he would be failing in his duty if he did not stress these considerations at this stage of the long and chequered story.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) G. Heaton Nicholls.

Copy to:-

Prime Minister's Private Secretary	P.S. to Secretary of State
Foreign Office	Mr. B.A.D. Burrows
	Mr. J.P.G. Finch
Colonial Office	P.S. to Secretary of State
	Mr. Trafford Smith
M/Defence	Lt. Col. Parry (for C.O.S.)

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61887

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18 NOV 1947 With the Comptroller of the
Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations. 14 NOV 1947

INDEXED 119

Put with

TOP SECRET

LETTER

E 10667/97/131

F.2781/43

From: Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations

To: High Commissioner for Union of South Africa
in London

(Sent 12th Nov., 1947)

TOP SECRET

My dear High Commissioner

Will you please refer to your letter of the 20th October,
No. P.S. 26/44/28, in which you gave us some suggestions by
Field Marshal Smuts on various aspects of the Palestine situation.
These have been given most careful consideration both here and in
the Foreign Office.

Field Marshal Smuts will, of course, be aware of two statements
of policy made by the Colonial Secretary at the United Nations
Assembly on the attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom. He will, I am sure, realize that illegal Jewish
immigration into Palestine, supported and financed by United States
citizens, has been an important contributory factor in making the
Mandate more unworkable, and is one reason for our present policy.
In the first of his statements, Mr. Creech-Jones said that we were
ready, first, to assume the responsibility for giving effect to any
plan on which agreement is reached between the Arabs and Jews, or,
secondly, to consider participating with others in the enforcement
of a settlement, having due regard to the inherent justice of the
settlement and the extent to which force would be required to give
effect to it, but that we would not ourselves undertake the
responsibility of implementing any settlement that was not acceptable
to both Arabs and Jews. At the same time, we have stated our
intention to withdraw United Kingdom troops and administration from
Palestine at an early date.

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Reference:

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61887

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We have adopted this attitude, partly because we wanted to make it absolutely clear that we were entirely disinterested, partly because we had already made so many fruitless suggestions of our own about a settlement for Palestine, and finally, because we hoped that, by facing Arabs and Jews, not to mention other Powers, with the realities of the situation, we might perhaps induce in them a more reasonable and realistic frame of mind, out of which some moves towards compromise might spring.

Given these circumstances, we feel that if we were now to become prematurely associated with any particular proposed settlement, the only result would be that we should lose all the advantages gained by our present attitude, that we should once more become the target for criticism, and that any prospect of constructive thinking would again be lost.

We feel that the best contribution to be made to the solution of the problem at present is to encourage all concerned to face up to the decisive question whether, when we go, we can hand over to some kind of constitutional authority, based on a mutually acceptable settlement, or whether we shall leave behind us either a vacuum or some authority charged with the onerous duty of enforcing a settlement which is not accepted by both sides. The problem of the date of our withdrawal and of safeguarding the vital British Mediterranean interests to which Field Marshal Smuts refers, both during and after our withdrawal, remains under urgent consideration, and we are doing what we can to bring the United States into consultation with ourselves on this aspect of the matter, in relation to the strategic position in the Middle East generally.

In conclusion, I should like to say that we entirely agree with Field Marshal Smuts' view on the Soviet attitude to partition. This has, as you will be aware, produced a strong revulsion among the Arabs against Soviet propaganda.

We /

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Reference:

FO

371

61887

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- 3 -

We shall look forward to discussing the whole problem with Field Marshal Smuts when he is here.

Yours ever

(Sgd.) P.J. Noel-Baker

Copy to:-

Prime Minister's Private Secretary	
Foreign Office	P.S. to Secretary of State (5)
	Mr. I.A. Kirkpatrick
	Mr. B.A.B. Burrows
	Mr. J.P.G. Finch
Colonial Office	P.S. to Secretary of State
	Mr. Trafford Smith
M/Defence	Lt. Col. Parry (for C.O.S.)

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Reference:

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Reference:

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313.

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123

E 10682

14 NOV

1947.

PALESTINE

Registry Number

E 10682/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

No.

M'Alindas
Damasqus

Dated

Received in Registry

38 Savings
5, Nov
14 -

Palestine Points by Lyman President
during conversation Lyman President revealed to
Palestine, and asked why had Russia and
the United States agreed to support partition
for Palestine they had never agreed on any
thing else before and their reason for
agreeing now must be totally different
Give text of evening conversation.

(Minutes.)

Last Paper.

10667

References.

W.A. Dept.
Northern Dept.

J. E. Cable
(J. E. Cable)
15/11

BAB
23.11

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

S, Watkinson & Co.
M.I. 3a.
M04
Admty
a.m.
Nov 15

(Action completed.)

2/24/11

(Index)

1/1/48

Next Paper.

E 10693

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Reference: FO 371/61887

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124

En Clair by WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION
Confidential Bag
FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

10682
14 NOV

Mr. Dundas.
No. 38 Saving
5th November, 1947.

R. 14th November

Repeated to Cairo No. 53 Jedda No. 59)
 Bagdad No. 61 Amman No. 58) ALL
 Beirut No. 143 United Kingdom Delegation) SAVING
 (New York) No. 2.)

The Syrian President sent for me yesterday and after some general conversation reverted to Palestine. He made inter alia the following points. Why had Russia and the United States agreed to support partition for Palestine? They had never agreed on anything else before and their reasons for agreeing now must be totally different. He realised that the Americans had a large Jewish population which was an important factor in the forthcoming Presidential elections. If the Americans were supporting partition solely for this political reason, why could they not be satisfied with making the gesture and leaving it at that? Why should they bring pressure to bear upon other states? He had been informed that the Americans had told the Chinese that they would receive no loan unless they supported partition and that Cuba was now being subjected to similar pressure. With regard to Russia, she could only have two reasons for supporting partition; the first, to ensure the maximum of trouble and disorder in the Middle East and the second, to get a real footing for Communism by taking part in an international police force or by cramming the Jewish state with Eastern European Communist Jews. Surely the Americans must understand this. Why then did America persist in her attitude.

2. I replied that I had no information to suggest that the Americans were pressing other countries to support partition and that I felt certain that the American Government were genuinely seeking an agreed solution in Palestine, or, if that proved impossible, the best solution for all parties concerned. The President took this opportunity of saying that even if he himself agreed to partition and other Arab leaders also, they would never be able to stand against their people. I reminded him that since the Arab countries were members of the United Nations they would have to stand by any decision of the General Assembly. The President made no comment. He ended the conversation by saying that if the Americans and the Russians stuck together on this issue, where would the British and Arabs find themselves.

3. I assume that the object of the conversation was to make clear to me that any support by His Majesty's Government for partition would be playing into the hands of the Russians.

4. I have given the gist of the President's comments to my American colleague.

k k k

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Reference: FO 371/61887

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128

10693

15 NOV

747

PALESTINE

Registry Number } E10693/957/31

TELEGRAM FROM

U.R. Del

No.

New York.

Dated

3367

Received in Registry

14 Nov

15 -

Warning of withdrawal from specific areas
Refer New York tel 3357 (E 10658/957/31)
Sir A. Cadogan gave no direct reply to Herschel
Forbass on whether provisional councils could
hope that British authorities would give adequate
warning of their intention to leave specific
areas.
Aske what further reply may be given on
this point.

Last Paper.

10682

(Minutes.)

References.

Sir A. Cadogan covered this
point shortly afterwards
JBMW. 27

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

S, Mathison. 80
M. 1. 3a
M 0 4
Admty
A.M.
✓ Nov 15

(Action completed.)

GP
10/27/11

(Index.)

10/27/11

Next Paper.

E 10695

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Reference:

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371

61887

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[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

CYPHER/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation)

10393

No: 3367

D.2.55 p.m. 15 NOV 14th November 1947

14th November 1947

R.8.26 p.m. 14th November 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington Saving

IMMEDIATE
SECRET
GLINT

1000's/901/21

My telegram No: 3357 paragraph 6.

Cadogan gave no direct reply to Herschel Johnson's on whether provisional councils could hope that British authorities would give adequate warning of their intention to leave specific areas. What further reply may we give on this point?

It might possibly be desirable to draw a distinction in this matter at any rate in our own minds between initial withdrawal from zones in Arab and Jewish Areas respectively (on assumption that we shall withdraw first from areas in which either community is already predominant) and subsequent withdrawals. Longer notice might without danger be given in the first case than as regards areas of subsequent withdrawal where populations are more mixed and such an announcement might precipitate outbreaks of disorder and sabotage.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No: 183

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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Reference: **FO** 371 / 61887

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E 10646

127

1947

PALESTINE

14 NOV

Registry Number } E10646/951/31
 TELEGRAM FROM
 U.S. Tel
 No. New York
 Dated 3343
 Received in Registry } 13, Nov
 14 -

Palstine Sub Committee and
 receipt of statement which Sir A. Hodgson
 proposes to make at meeting of Palstine
 Sub Committee on Nov 13.

Last Paper.
 10833

(Minutes.)

The statement is now out
 JB MW. 14

References.

- Now see E10657/951/31.
 This statement was made
 as it stands.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Whithersan. P.O.
 M.I. 30.
 M.O. 4
 Admty
 H.M.
 Nov 14

News Dept - [Signature]

Infu. Policy Dept - [Signature]

Mr. Beins
 MW. 14
 (BEITH)

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

[Signature] 14/11

[Signature] 14/11

In P.P. 100. (NY) (47) 11 (89/ 13/11

[Signature] 27/11

Next Paper.

In Arab Office [Signature] 14/11

Mr. S. Beins
 Nov. 28

E10657

Wt. 24772/717 17895 10/38 F.O.P.

L.P.L.R. 2/12

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Reference: FO 371 61887

128

10346 E

14 NOV

[This telegram is of particular ~~importance~~ and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3343

D. 12.46 p.m. 13th November 1947

R. 6.05 p.m. 13th November 1947.

13th November 1947.

Repeated to: High Commissioner Palestine
Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE.
GIANT.

Following is first draft of statement which Cadogan proposes to make at meeting of Palestine Sub-Committee One due to begin at 3.0 p.m. local time today. Any alterations will be telegraphed as soon as possible.

[Begins].

"In his statement to the Ad Hoc Committee on 26th September the Colonial Secretary announced that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had decided that they must plan for an early withdrawal of the British forces and of the British administration from Palestine. The various technical problems connected with this withdrawal have since been carefully examined in London, and I am now in a position to provide this Sub-Committee and the Ad Hoc Committee with more detailed information of the intentions of my Government.

There are two aspects of this withdrawal the military and the civil. On the military side, every effort is being made to reduce to a minimum the period required for the operation. It is still not possible to foresee exactly how long it will take to withdraw from Palestine not only the troops themselves but also their very substantial supplies and equipment. I am authorised to state however that our authorities have been directed to plan for the evacuation to be completed by 1st August 1948. So long as British troops remain in any part of Palestine they must of course maintain law and order in the areas of which they are still in occupation. I am instructed however to make it clear that British troops would not be available as the instrument for the enforcement of settlement in Palestine against either Arabs or Jews. The fact that it would be impracticable to withdraw the last military contingents from Palestine before next summer does not by any means imply that we shall continue to maintain a civil administration in Palestine throughout the intervening period. On the contrary we reserve the right to lay down the mandate and to bring our civil administration to an end, any time after it has become evident that no settlement acceptable to both Jews and Arabs has been reached by the Assembly.

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In that event there would be an interval between the termination of the mandate and the withdrawal of the last British troops. During that interval His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would no longer maintain a civil administration in Palestine and would confine themselves to preserving order in areas still controlled by their remaining forces. It follows, and I think it my duty to the Sub-Committee to remove any doubt upon this point without further delay, that if a United Nations Commission were at work in Palestine taking preparatory steps for a settlement which would require enforcement, it must not expect British authorities either to exercise administrative responsibility or to maintain law and order except in the limited areas of which they would necessarily remain in occupation during the process of withdrawal".

[Ends].

Foreign Office please pass Most Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 178.

[Copies sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for transmission to Jerusalem].

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Mr. Troutbeck

Mr. Beckett

Mr. Gallop

Mr. R. B. Stevens

Mr. E. A. Radice

Miss Powell

Mr. H. Gee

Mr. Mason

Mr. Gore-Booth

Mr. Tomkins

Mr. Goodwin

Mr. R. Heppel

Miss Salt

Mr. Wilkinson

Mr. Arculus

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I.O.C.(N.Y.)(47) II (89).
13th November, 1947.

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

CAUTION

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CAUTION

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STATEMENT BY SIR ALEXANDER CADOGAN IN
SUB-COMMITTEE I OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE
ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION,
13th NOVEMBER, 1947

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UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION

Statement to be made by Sir Alexander Cadogan in
Sub-Committee I of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Palestinian Question, 13th November, 1947.

In his statement to the Ad Hoc Committee on the 26th
September, the Colonial Secretary announced that His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom had decided that they must plan for
an early withdrawal of the British forces and of the British
administration from Palestine. The various technical problems
connected with this withdrawal have since been carefully examined in
London, and I am now in a position to provide this Sub-Committee and
the Ad Hoc Committee with more detailed information of the intentions
of my Government.

There are two aspects of this withdrawal, the military
and the civil. On the military side, every effort is being made to
reduce to a minimum the period required for the operation. It is
still not possible to foresee exactly how long it will take to
withdraw from Palestine not only the troops themselves but also their
very substantial supplies and equipment. I am authorised to state,
however, that our authorities have been directed to plan for the
evacuation to be completed by the 1st August, 1948. So long as
British troops remain in any part of Palestine, they must of course
maintain law and order in the areas of which they are still in
occupation. I am instructed, however, to make it clear that British
troops would not be available as the instrument for the enforcement of
settlement in Palestine against either Arabs or Jews.

The fact that it would be impracticable to withdraw the
last military contingents from Palestine before next summer does not
by any means imply that we shall continue to maintain a civil
administration in Palestine throughout the intervening period. On
the contrary, we reserve the right to lay down the Mandate and to

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bring our civil administration to an end at any time after it has become evident that no settlement acceptable to both Jews and Arabs has been reached by the Assembly.

In that event there would be an interval between the termination of the Mandate and the withdrawal of the last British troops. During that interval His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would no longer maintain a civil administration in Palestine and would confine themselves to preserving order in areas still controlled by their remaining forces. It follows, and I think it my duty to the ~~Sub~~-Committee to remove any doubt upon this point without further delay, that if a United Nations commission were at work in Palestine taking preparatory steps for a settlement which would require enforcement it must not expect British authorities either to exercise administrative responsibility or to maintain law and order except in the limited areas of which they would necessarily remain in occupation during the process of withdrawal.

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With Compliments

The Arab Office

Mr Burrows

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COMMENT BY THE ARAB OFFICE, LONDON, ON THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT OF 13.11.47

14th November, 1947

The statement made yesterday to the United Nations' Palestine Committee by Sir Alexander Cadogan on behalf of the British Government reveals a policy which it is impossible to reconcile honestly with the British Government's previous declarations that they would not implement a solution by force in Palestine.

By adopting the course defined by Sir Alexander Cadogan the British Government would in fact be tacitly using its forces in Palestine during the interim period before their withdrawal to enable the partition scheme to be imposed on the Arabs. This is the unavoidable implication of the announcement by the British representative that (1) British troops would be responsible for maintaining law and order in the areas occupied by them till their departure; and (2) that Britain would not oppose any steps taken by the United Nations to carry out partition if the Assembly should adopt this solution by a two thirds majority, and that there would be no objection, while the British troops were still in Palestine, to a United Nations Commission coming into the country to demarcate frontiers and set up councils and militias in the Arab and Jewish parts. The two conditions taken together can mean only one thing and that is that the Arabs would in point of fact be prevented by British troops from resisting partition and the creation of a Jewish state. By withdrawing first from the Jewish area and concentrating until their departure in the Arab area (a manoeuvre which could be easily carried out in pursuance of the British Government's declared plans) the British forces would thus hold the Arabs down while the Jewish state was being established under the auspices of the United Nations. This is exactly what the American plan, as explained by Mr. Herschel Johnson a few days ago, envisaged. Mr. Johnson said in fact that the British would not have to do any positive enforcing; that the mere presence of their troops who would naturally be responsible for law and order until they withdrew would be enough. And this is what the British Government has now apparently agreed to.

In these circumstances it is disingenuous of the British Government to go on repeating that their troops in Palestine will not be available to impose a solution by force, for this is precisely what they would be doing. The fact that their role would be apparently passive would not alter its real character nor deceive the Arabs.

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(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

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Sir A Cadogan
No. 3328
12th November, 1947.

D: 10.26 a.m. 12th November, 1947

R: 3.36 p.m. 12th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem and
Washington Saving.

IMMEDIATE.

Following upon comment of United Kingdom representative reported in my telegram No. 3325 Pearson said that this underlined difficulties of working group on implementation. They were proceeding upon certain assumptions and were not sure whether these assumptions were consistent or inconsistent with His Majesty's Government's attitude. He suggested therefore that it would be of advantage to Working Group and since there might be points in Group's proposals on which explanations were required also to mandatory power if a representative of United Kingdom could appear before working group. Cadogan replied that his delegation would be ready to put themselves at disposal of Working Group and do what they could to expedite work. Rest of discussion in afternoon and evening meetings of sub-committee one was devoted to boundaries.

Foreign Office please pass immediate High Commissioner Jerusalem as my telegram No. 175.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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